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Purpose: To investigate the impact of environmental uncertainty, supplier assets specificity, 
prior relationship duration, purchase volume, on buyer opportunism in the Egyptian sugar 
industry’s dyadic relationships between sugar mills and sugarcane farmers.  
 Design/methodology/approach: The sampling frame of the study was sugarcane’s farmers 
registered in the transaction records register of Kom Ombo sugar mill in Aswan city in 
Egypt. Convenience sampling technique was used to administer 120 questionnaires. A total 
of 120 responses were collected for the study. The study employed multiple regression 
analysis to test the hypotheses. 
Findings: Environmental uncertainty has positive impact on buyer opportunism, while 
introduction of supplier assets spacificity has negative impact by reducing the level of buyer 
opportunism. Moreover, the negative effects on buyer opportunism depends on the level of 
relation duration, supplier sales volume and supplier workforce. 
Research limitations/implications: The study hypothesizes only three antecedents of 
opportunism gives the study room to study other causative factors of opportunism in the 
future. Moreover, the study employed a cross-sectional research design, limiting the study 
in generalizing the results in the long-term. High internal validity of the study makes it to 
draw same conclusions in other industries. 
Theoretical implications: The study depicts environmental uncertainty is a causal factor of 
opportunistic behaviors in buyer-seller relationships. Moreover, supplier asset specificity 
creates dyads of competitive advantages and tailor the relationships as such they have a 
negative impact on opportunistic behavior, even in presence of environmental uncertainty. 
Relationship duration plays a role in dissipating the opportunistic behavior through 
relational norms formed. 
Managerial implications: Opportunism undermines exchange relations and is a factor 
caused by various prerequisites such as environmental uncertainty, short-term relations and 
power of exchange parties. This study therefore proposes measures that aim to eliminate 
opportunistic behavior such as formation of trade unions for collective bargaining, aligning 
long-term goals with sugar mills goals and enforcing formal contracts rather that totally 
depending on gentleman’s agreements as a way of conducting business. 
 
Key words: Buyer opportunism; Relationship duration; supplier transaction-specific 
investment; Sugar industry; Supplier sales volume; Egypt; Transaction Cost Analysis; 































CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION 
 Introduction 
The introductory chapter of this thesis presents the background to the research, research 
problem, objectives of the study and justification of the study. Furthermore, the chapter 
elaborates the scope and delimitation of the study and the organization of the work.   
 Background Information  
The knock-on effect of the highly increasing world population every year has led to higher 
demand for processed foods which use sugar as the most strategic commodity (Svatoš et al 
2013). In fact, the international sugar market is one of the most highly distorted agricultural 
commodity markets in the world with both raw and refined sugar markets characterized by 
significant and widespread domestic support and trade distorting policies, such as 
guaranteed minimum payments to producers, production and marketing controls, state-
regulated retail prices, tariffs, import quotas and export subsidies (Nyberg, 2008). 
 
Moreover, Nyberg (2008) asserts that sugar is not only used as a food additive but also offers 
other production alternatives such as animal feed, fiber and energy, particularly biofuels 
(sugar-based ethanol) used to generate electricity which is a substitute of the ever-volatile 
oil energy resulting in a heightened focus on sugar as an internationally traded resource. In 
fact, extant literature posits strong linkages between world sugar and oil prices in recent 
years driven by the relationships between sugar as the primary ethanol raw material and 
exports of both sugar and ethanol in the world; particularly in Brazil which is the largest 
sugar producer (Nyberg, 2008; Chen, 2015). 
 
Ahmad (2013) posits that sugar as a major agricultural player has impacted markets from 
Europe to Asia and in the Americas. Sugar comes after wheat in strategic importance in 
Europe, Africa, the Americas and Australia, while sugar is ranked second only to rice to 
Asian countries and after wheat in Australia, Europe and Americas.  
 
According to FAO (2012), the world sugar trade stood at USD 24 billion of which 
developing countries account for over 80% of the total transactions, showing its importance 
to the emerging economies through GDP contributions. Sugarcane’s cultivated area globally 
stands at a total of 59 million acres and the total production of sugar was approximately 
about 175.1 million metric tons in 2014/2015 in terms of sugarcane on average (excluding 
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beet sugar), accounting for 75 to 80 % of global production per year with average yearly 
production growth is about 1.34% (Amrouk et al 2013). The global consumption of sugar 
has risen about 2 % on a yearly basis since the middle of 1980, with population growth as 
the key driver (Andersson, Hanna Jenshagen,2010).  
 
Moreover, the sugar global consumption for 2016/17 has exceeded production thus drawing 
stocks down to the lowest level since 2010/11 (USDA, 2016).  Furthermore, the rising 
demand of sugar has been sustained by drawing down stock levels in recent years, reaching 
historically low levels as shown in (figure 1) below (USDA, 2016). 
Figure 1: Global Sugar Consumption vs Production 
 
Source: USDA (2016) 
 
As El-Sharif et al (2009) point out, the sugar industry is an important source of food security 
due to its strategic significance for countries’ production processes in the food and 
agricultural sectors.  
 
Agriculture is a key pillar of the Egyptian national economy which employs about 35% of 
the total country’s workforce, and contributes about 20% of the national GDP and about 
20% of total exports. In addition to its contribution to the provision of food for the ever-
growing Egyptian population it also provides crude materials necessary for many other 
national industries with a further contribution to the process of capital accumulation in the 
national economy (El Sharif, 2009; Hussein and Mahdy, 1998). Furthermore, more than half 
of Egypt's population (53%) live in rural areas and depend largely on agriculture as a key 
resource for their income and livelihoods (Shalaby ,2011), thus targeting agricultural 
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development strategy in Egypt to achieve food security especially on the key strategic crops 
including sugar crops (both beet and sugarcane). 
 
 However, the industry has seen many a problem in the dyadic relationships between millers 
(sugarcane producers) and sugarcane farmers resulting to a self-destruct concept of Egypt’s 
sugar industry, resulting to sub-optimal production and a progressive decline of the industry 
over the years. This study has therefore has chosen the Egyptian sugar industry as a setting 
to investigate the underlying buyer opportunism in the industry due persistent problems such 
as low profits and high costs especially on the producers’ point of view.  
 
In interorganizational relationships small-scale farmers such as those in the sugar industry, 
are considered in general to be dependent and vulnerable. This is due to significant resource 
inequalities and their proneness of asymmetric power disadvantages (Masuku and Kirsten, 
2004). In the sugar industry supply chain, opportunistic behavior may occur when the buyers 
(the sugarcane mills) realizes that the farmers have limited opportunities for redeploying 
relationship- specific assets (Royer, 1999). Joshi and Arnold (1997) suggest that 
opportunistic behavior is a purposeful behavior, meaning that this behavior is likely to 
emerge in situations where the party (the sugarcane millers) expects a high probability of 
success from such behavior.  
 
Cullen and Hickman (2001) suggest that the main factors that influence supply chain 
efficiency includes informal element such as trust, norms or standards that support exchange 
relations regardless of contractual obligations. In Ramdas and Spekman (2000), authority 
balance is positively related to alliance performance in the sense that the more one partner 
controls the alliance through authority advantage, the more likely that the alliance would 
perform poorly. Masuku and Kirsten (2004) conclude ‘…that trusting relationships are 
perceived to promote alliance performance and that the presence of authority advantage 
has a negative effect on alliance performance, which is further worsened by the absence of 
trust”. Other scholars, like Medina-Munoz and Medina-Munoz (2002) also emphasizes the 




 Research Problem 
This research is concerned with the study of buyer opportunism characterized with behaviors 
such as deceit and false promises towards sugarcane growers, who supply the sugarcanes to 
their respective millers; bringing about exchange hazards buyer-supplier relationships. 
Exchange risks arise when a partner in an exchange relationship opts to pursue his or her 
own interest at the expense of the other (Williamson, 1985). 
From an overview of the universal problems the sugarcane farmers face; many have been as 
a result of their exchange relations with the buyers (sugar millers) that all reflect the element 
of opportunistic behavior withholding or distorting information, lies, stealing, cheating, 
calculated efforts to mislead, disguise, confuse, and shirking or failing to fulfill promises or 
obligations (John, 1984; Williamson, 1985); all at the expense of the farmers. 
Moreover, the buyers’ opportunistic behavior is expected to be deterred when relationship 
duration increases and in scenarios where the supplier trades massive volumes of sugarcane 
compared to the small-scale farmers. Regarding the empirical and methodological gaps 
identified in the extant literature in as far as sugar millers and sugarcane farmers are 
concerned, little has been done per the extant literature especially in the light of the 
developing economies such as Egypt.  
In the light of the potential exchange hazards that are embedded in the buyer-seller 
relationships, this paper aims to examine the prerequisites of opportunism existing in this 
relationship through theoretical paradigms of Transaction Cost Analysis, Relational 
Contracting Theory and Power Dependence theory to answer the following questions; 
• What are the factors that influence opportunism of sugar millers towards sugarcane 
growers in Upper Egypt? 
• What factors deter buyer opportunism (sugar millers) behavior towards sugarcane 
growers? 
 Objective of the Study 
The primary objective of this study is to examine buyer-seller relationships in the Egyptian 
sugar industry. This study focuses on exchange relationships between sugar millers and 
sugarcane growers in Upper Egypt as the unit of analysis. 
Thus, the specific objectives of the study are:  
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(a) to examine the role environmental uncertainty plays on opportunism in the sugar millers 
and farmers’ exchange relationships when supplier specific investments are introduced. 
(b) to examine the moderating effect of relationship duration on the association between 
sugar millers power with respect to the resulting opportunism. 
(c) to examine the moderating effect of scale of production (small scale or large-scale 
famers) and supplier work force (supplier size) on the association between farmers’ 
unilateral specific investments and sugar millers’ opportunism.  
 Justification for the Study  
The sugar industry in Egypt is one of the most important sectors that has a positive impact 
in contribution of the national income. Despite recent political unrest and a decline in GDP 
growth, the importance of this industry raises where it affects other sectors like 
transportation and agriculture by makes the industry having a potential contribution in 
creating jobs, directly and indirectly, leading to development in other economic activities as 
sugar industry is relatively labor intensive typical of manufacturing industry (El Sharif et al, 
2009). 
Furthermore, sugar is a strategic commodity in Egypt’s economy. As El-Sharif et al (2009) 
point out more than half of the Egyptian population live and work in rural areas and depend 
largely on agriculture as a key resource for their income and livelihoods. According to 
Mohamed, Elgazzar and Abdelsalam (2017) the Egyptian sugar industry has recently been 
undergoing a dramatic challenge to survive due to the misappropriation endorsed in the 
industry coupled by an elevation of destructive impact on the supply chain participants and 
activities involved in the sugar supply chain which hinder the way business carryout their 
necessary business activities. 
In the light of the Egyptian sugar industry therefore the research aims to study the causal 
factors of the buyer’s opportunism as described from the perspective of suppliers (farmers) 
of sugar in the buyers-seller relationship. Therefore, this research will employ three theories 
including power-dependence theory, transactional cost theory and relational contracting 
theory as the primary theoretical frameworks seeking to answer the research questions raised 
in the preceding subsection.  
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 Scope and delimitation of the Study 
This research includes sugarcane growers who are suppliers within the Egyptian Sugar and 
Integrated Industries company (SIIC), a sugarcane-growing in the upper Egypt region this 
region was chosen as represented high percentage of the cultivated areas and where all 
millers are located. The study is also limited to the existence of a relationship between buyer 
and supplier. Thus, suppliers give their perception of the relationship they have with a 
buying firm over a time. Thus, the use of dynamic relationship approaches rather than the 
network approach, with data collected from one side of the dyad, specifically from supplier 
side of the buyer-supplier relationship under study. 
 Organization of the Study 
 This thesis consists of nine chapters. Chapter 1 presents a brief background to the Egyptian 
sugar industry, research gap and questions, objectives of the study, justification of the study 
and scope and delimitation of the study. Chapter 2 presents the current situation in Egyptian’s 
sugar industry and the supply chain of sugar industry. Chapter 3 gives a theoretical 
framework to the proposed study. Chapter 4 discuss the research conceptual model and the 
hypotheses which are developed considering TCA and RCT theories. Chapter 5 describes 
research design and the methodology which are used in such a study. The definition and 
operationalization of variables are discussed in chapter six. As for chapter seven it covers 
the measurement assessment and data validation. Chapter eight presents the regression 
model and the result of hypotheses tested in the study. Finally, chapter nine the last chapter 
deals with research results, theoretical and managerial implications, limitations and 
suggestions and further research studies. 
 Summary 
As a summary, this chapter clarifies the background of this study based on buyer-supplier 
relationship followed by the research problem, objectives of the study, significance, scope 
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CHAPTER TWO – SUGAR INDUSTRY IN EGYPT 
 2.1 Introduction  
This chapter shows a brief overview of the history of sugar industry with sheds light on the 
production and consumption of sugar, as well as the sugar value chain. 
2.2 Egypt’s Sugar Industry Overview 
 According to Shehata (2015), sugarcane is the primary source to produce sugar, molasses 
and sugar cane juice while sugar beet is the second source of sugar production in Egypt. 
Moreover, sugarcane also is used in animal feeding next and production of alcohol (El-Sharif 
et al ,2009). In this study, the area of concern is sugarcane production and how opportunism 
arises between the farmers and sugar millers. Sugarcane accounts for 66.1% of the industry’s 
total sugar production. (Shehata, 2015). The sugar industry offers over 23,000 jobs in the 
country, mostly through unskilled labor (USDA, 2016). 
 
Moreover, the sugar industry in Egypt is characterized as a monopsony market where there 
are many suppliers with only one buyer (USDA, 2015). The government is considered the 
sole owner of all the sugar mills in the country (Abdel–Maksoud and El-Sharabassy, 2007). 
According to USDA (2016), Egyptian Sugar and Integrated Industries Company(SIIC) is 
the one responsible for managing all the sugar mills on behalf of the government. The 
company was founded in 1956 followed by 9 mills which are Hawamdeya in Elgiza, Abu 
Qurqas in Minya, Sohag Gerga factory and the Nag Hammadi, Deshna and Qus in Qena, 
Armant factory, Kom Ombo and Edfu in Aswan, where Kom Ombo factory is the largest at 
the level of all in the country in terms of size and production. Furthermore, these mills are 
located where sugarcane crop is grown on a commercial scale in Upper Egypt, starting from 
the southern centers of the province of Minya and to Aswan which cultivated in tropical and 
temperate regions.  
 
The cultivated area of sugarcane harvest about 100,000 hectares (USDA, 2016). 
Furthermore, the concentration of sugarcane cultivation is in Aswan, Qena, Suhag, and El- 
Minya governorates with a total 97.1% of sugarcane crop area in Egypt. (USDA, 2016; 
USDA, 2015).  Furthermore, Shalaby, (2011) and USDA, (2016)’s report, sugarcane is 
planted in two seasons which spring and autumn, the crop takes 11 to 12 months to grow, as 
the autumn season’s planting extends from September through October, while spring 




Recently, production of sugarcane in Egypt faces many challenges due to the increasing 
challenges in terms of water supply, government policies, highly increasing population 
growth. In fact, there have been calls for a reduction of sugar cane area, however it was 
suggested that it would threaten the sugarcane industry in Upper Egypt (USDA, 2016, 
USDA, 2015).  
 
Due to the importance of sugar as a strategic commodity the government has sought to help 
the industry by encouraging farmers by subsidizing the sugarcane price through the state-
run Sugar and Integrated Industries Company (SIIC), (USDA, 2015). Nonetheless, increase 
in production of sugarcane is expected to grow by 3 percent or 60,000 MT to reach 2.185 
MMT in 2016/2017 from in 2015/2016 production of 2.125 MMT. According to USDA 
(2016) the study problem has presented the gap between production and consumption of 
sugar. The upcoming section will present the gap between both production and consumption 
in the Egyptian sugar industry.  
 
2.3 Sugar Production and Consumption 
According to Werr (2015) & USDA (2016) Egypt produces approximately 2.185 million 
tons domestically and consumes approximately 3,000,000 tons, an increase accounted for 
due to the ever-growing increasing Egyptian population. The total raw sugar imports were 
850,000 MT in 2015/16 and Brazil and the EU were Egypt’s main suppliers for sugar 
imports. Egypt’s sugar exports over 200,000 Metric Tons in 2015/16, and its major market 
is Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya (USDA, 2016). 
 
As El-Sharif et al (2009) and USDA (2015) point out, a gap between production and 
consumption of sugar in Egypt started to appear after the 1973 war this gap has significantly 
increased at the beginning of the eighties in 1981, 573,000 tons increased to 978,000 tons 
by the year 2006 with an annual increase of 50,000 metric tons’ gap between production and 
consumption that’s due to the population increment in addition to the beginning of the 
opening economy policy after 1973 and the subsequent variation in food patterns. Figure 2 
below which demonstrates the gap between Egypt’s sugar production and consumption for 




Figure 2: Egypt's Sugar Production and Consumption 2012-2017 
 
Source: USDA – 2016 
 
2.4 Egypt’s Sugar Supply Chain   
The sugarcane industry has faced several challenges last years like increased international 
competitiveness, lower commodity prices and an industrialization of agriculture as farming 
shifts from a rural lifestyle to an agri-business sector with a value chain mentality. While the 
cost of production is in general increasing, the long-term sugar price trend has been 
downwards. Also, increasing competition from new sweeteners (erythritol, asper tan) puts 
pressure on sugar prices (Spencer, 2004). 
 
The supply chain of agri-foods doesn’t differ from any other supply chain in the way that 
different processes and activities are working together with the goal to bring products and 
services to the market with the purpose to satisfy customer demand. However, the agri-food 
supply chain differs in the characteristics of the product, which are their limited shelf-life 
and their demand and price variability, the importance played by other factors such as quality 
and safety, and weather-related variability. This combination can make the underlying 
supply chain more complex and more difficult to manage than other supply chains 
(Ahumada and Villalobos, 2009).  
According to Higgins et al (2007), sugar industries are primarily “push chains”. The 
sugarcane is pushed through the supply chain to produce raw sugar and sold at market value 
as a bulk commodity. There is minimal product differentiation, and the main difference 
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between sugar industries across countries are the number of farms and the ownership 




Figure 3: Egyptian Sugar Industry Value Chain 
 
 
Source: Author’s own illustration based on literature review (2017) 
 
Figure 3 above has presented the supply chain in the Egypt’s sugar industry through in a 
condensed illustration. The supply chain involves several actors starting by the farmers as 
suppliers of raw sugarcane until the end process where the products reach the final consumer. 
The farmers play a major role in providing the raw materials (sugarcane) to the sugar mills. 
According to the USDA (2016) report, the total area cultivated by farmers in Egypt account 
for over 100,00 hectares of which most of the area is in the Upper Egypt region.  
Other major actors include transporters of sugarcane to the mills and refineries. Majority of 
the transporters are the farmers themselves using tractors, animals such as donkeys and small 
trucks. Alternative transporters are sugar mills that offer transport services through local 
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light railway lines from major sugarcane collection centers. The train consists of 25 carts 
loaded with 10-15 tons of cane per cart with the carts given numbers according to the cane 
owner. (Abdel-Mawla, 2012; Nakhla and Haggar, 2014).  
 
Figure 2.2 further depicts the by-product market which plays a role in the sugar supply chain. 
The producers provide this market with by-products such as bagasse which is a fibrous 
material after squeezing the juice from canes, filter mud or cake after cane juice filtration, 
molasses used majorly in animal feed production, and alcohol and chemical catalysts and 
products (Nakhla, 2015). 
 
The export market plays a vital role in the Egyptian sugar industry. According to USDA 
(2016), Egypt exports about 200-250,000 tonnes of the sugar it produces to Kenya, 
Tanzania, Sudan and Saudi Arabia, accounting for the 1% of its total production output. 
respectively.  Despite Egypt’s sugar deficit, Egypt still exports some of its sugar and this 
can be justified by the theory of comparative advantage where still Egypt has advantages 
based on the opportunity costs of not investing in other industries that the country has 
absolute disadvantage. 
 
The import market plays a major role in sustaining the whole Egyptian sugar industry by 
accounting for the production deficit. It accounts for 26 to 30% of the needs of the Egyptians 
through considerable amounts of subsidies. According to USDA (2016), Egypt imported 
over 800,000 metric tonnes of sugar to satisfy its sugar deficit with most of it coming from 
the EU and Brazil. 
 
Other value creators include the industrial sector such as soft-drink manufacturers who buy 
in bulk, mega and super agents who store and break bulk to further sell to wholesalers, then 
to retailers and to the final consumer. This study is therefore mainly focused on the first two 
supply chain players, that is the relationship between farmers as the supplier for sugarcane 
and sugar mills as the buyer. Furthermore, figure 3 portrays three main functional areas 
within the sugarcane supply chain for the area of the study; production, harvest and transport. 
In production, the main decisions relate to how farmers grow crops regarding the 
specifications given by the sugar millers. This can be for example allocation of land and 
sowing time, type of sugarcane breed to be planted, sugarcane husbandry and quality control. 
In harvest, the main decisions be will related to timing for collecting the crops, and which 
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recourses to use (equipment and labor). Transportation involves decisions of choice of 
transport mode and routes, whether the farmer will transport the crops by their own transport 
mode or using the mill’s transport mode (Ahumada and Villalobos, 2009).    
2.5 Relevance of Egypt as a Research Setting 
Egypt is one of the world leading countries in sugar production with comparative advantage 
to many sugar producing countries, and sugar is considered as one of the most important 
commodities to the Egyptians (Mohamed, Elgazzar and Abdelsalam, 2017).  The strategic 
significance of this industry with respect to the GDP contribution, job offerings as illustrated 
in the supply chain in the preceding sub-chapter, and pivotal role in sustaining other 
industries that need sugar and its by-products as inputs has motivated the researcher to 
initiate this study in the Egyptian sugar industry.  
 
Furthermore, many studies in the Egyptian sugar industries have not addressed the dyadic 
relations issues farmers face with respect to the sugar mills.  The Egyptian sugar market is 
laid in a monopsony market structure, where there are many producers and sellers and one 
buyer (the Egyptian government that owns all the sugar mills), a case which is very rare 
according to Van Weele (2009). Monopsony situations result in unilateral power especially 
due to low supply risk and the perishability of the raw materials in question. This scenario 
may result in opportunistic tendencies especially by the powerful sole buyer to gain profits 
at the expense of the peasants. This study therefore aims to bring into light the opportunistic 
nature of the existing monopsony market in the Egyptian sugar markets and factors that 
enhance such practices leading to inefficiencies in the Egyptian sugar supply chain.  
2.6 Summary 
This chapter has provided an overview of the Egypt’s sugar industry and its market, as well 
as explored and discussed the gap between both production and consumption of sugar during 
the past six years. This chapter has discussed sugar value chain and its actors.  The upcoming 



















CHAPTER THREE- LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter gives a literature overview of the three theories that are incorporated in the 
research paper including Transaction Cost Analysis (TCA), Relational Contracting Theory 
(RCT) and Power Dependence Theory, the three theories mentioned in this chapter are used 
to develop the variables of the conceptual model relevant to the study.  
3.2 Transaction Cost Analysis 
Transaction Cost Analysis has been an important anchor for most economists and other 
audiences, especially in the marketing discipline and organizations. The theory, which 
belongs to the “New Institutional Economics” paradigm was developed from the works on 
transaction costs by Ronald Coarse and John Commons in the 1930s and later developed by 
other economists such as Oliver Williamson (Williamson, 1979, 1985; Rindfleisch and 
Heide, 1997). The theory has initiated research interests from various disciplines such as 
economics, sociology, politics, organization theories, business strategies and marketing 
(Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). 
According to Williamson (1985), the theory sheds light on how transactions are organized 
through different forms of governance.  In fact, TCA propounds that a transaction between 
exchange parties is the basic unit of analysis and dictates the forms of governance structures 
to be used in a dyad to economize on the transaction costs (Williamson, 1985, 1993).  
Williamson (1985) has distinguished transaction costs into two main categories, that is ex-
ante transaction costs and ex-post transaction costs.  Ex-ante transaction costs rise prior to 
establishing agreements and can take the form of costs arising when drafting or negotiating 
a contract. Ex-post costs rise after agreements and can include costs of monitoring and 
enforcing agreements (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997; Williamson 1985). 
TCA’s analytical paradigm stresses the importance of efficient governance mechanisms for 
supporting exchange relations (Heide, 1994; Heide and John, 1992). Moreover, Heide and 
John (1992) and Williamson (1985) further argue that certain exchange characteristics give 
rise to transaction difficulties and can be counteracted by different governance mechanisms 
that have different efficiencies in minimizing costs. Buvik and Grønhaug (2000) assert that 
TCA follows a relative efficiency in exchange process, focusing on net gains provided by 
economies of production and the different governance performance. 
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Williamson (1985; 1979) asserts that transactions bear different characteristics transaction 
and as the frequency of transaction increases or with the introduction of specific investments 
external market as a governance mechanism leads to inefficiency of the exchange 
relationship. In fact, external market mechanism has a short-term orientation and views 
inter-firm relationships as discrete and does not consider long-term bilateral relationships 
(Williamson 1985; Heide, 1994; Buvik and Haugland, 2005).  Moreover, Heide, (1994) posit 
the focus in market governance environments is short term economic profits and the supply 
and demand forces are the primary mechanism for interfirm-coordination. 
As external market transaction costs rise, non-market governance forms assume the role of 
governing exchange relationships (Heide, 1994, Williamson 1985).  These include hybrid 
governance and vertical integration that are more efficient in guiding exchange relationships 
between buyers and sellers (Williamson 1985; Heide, 1994). 
Bilateral or hybrid governance involves bilateral adaptations in a dyadic relationship aimed 
to achieve a common objective (Heide, 1994). According to Buvik and Haugland, 2005 and 
Heide (1994), relationships are significant in this governance and evaluative processes 
involve the assessment of not only skills but also general beliefs, attitudes and values. 
Moreover, relationships are strategic, and planning is jointly done, decentralized, flexible, 
and exhibits lower levels of specificity. This kind of governance however can lead to small-
number conditions creating a dependence trap caused by high switching costs (Buvik and 
Grønhaug, 2000). 
Unilateral or hierarchical governance incorporates power asymmetry and exchanges in this 
governance are governed by contracts that contain explicit specifications of duties to ensure 
that the required behaviors are performed such as vertical integration (Heide, 1994; 
Williamson 1985). Contracts in this governance often contain standard rules, monitoring 
mechanisms, and terminating clauses are frequently used as a governance mechanism and 
incentive systems are designed to reward observed behavior (Buvik and Haugland, 2005; 
Heide, 1994).  Both hybrid and unilateral governance structures are a contingency plan in 




3.2.1 Behavioral Assumptions of TCA 
The TCA microanalytical framework is based on the interplay between two main 
assumptions of human behavior i.e., bounded rationality and opportunism.  The two 
concepts are further elaborated in the following two subchapters. 
3.2.1.1 Opportunism 
Extant literature on transaction cost analysis framework mentions the opportunism construct 
as a vital assumption based on the nature of the economic man forming exchange parties. 
This construct however has brought contradictory views among scholars of various 
disciplines including organization theory and marketing, claiming little explicit studies on 
opportunism (Wathne and Heide, 2000; Rokkan, Heide and Wathne, 2003). In fact, much of 
the focus on the existing studies is on strategies for controlling the opportunistic behavior, 
forgetting the main opportunism construct itself (Wathne and Heide, 2000).   
Furthermore, Wathne and Heide (2000) posit that very few studies have measured 
opportunism and there are unresolved questions pertaining to the definition of opportunism 
due to the complex nature of the phenomenon. These two factors have rendered the strategies 
of tackling opportunism to be ineffective (Wathne and Heide,2000).  
According to Williamson (1985) opportunism is defined as self-interest seeking with guile 
and ranges from lying, stealing, cheating and all kinds of deceit, with calculated efforts to 
mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate or confuse. Williamson (1985) further argues the 
introduction of asymmetric information gives room for people to act opportunistically for 
their own interest instead of the other party. According to Masten (1988) and Wathne and 
Heide (2000), Williamson’s (1975; 1985) definition of opportunism can be termed as blatant 
or strong form opportunism and may manifest in the initiation stage of an exchange 
relationship through deliberate misrepresentations of some kind (ex-ante) or through 
violations over the course of the relationship (ex-post). This is mainly due moral weaknesses 
in humans that make it difficult in honoring contracts (John, 1984, Wathne and Heide, 2000). 
Wathne and Heide (2000) elucidate blatant opportunistic behavior in a marketing 
perspective through traits such as falsification of expense reports, breach of distribution 
contracts, bait-and-switch tactics, quality shirking and violation of promotion agreements.  
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Opportunism poses transactional hazards in the purported exchange relations especially 
where there is the introduction of specific investments (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; 
Rokkan, Heide and Wathne, 2003). In fact, opportunism, can also reduce a firm’s incentive 
to invest valuable resources, therefore undermining both a firm and the exchange 
relationship’s efficiencies (Rokkan, Heide and Wathne, 2003).  Wathne and Heide (2000) 
assert that specific assets could be used as a form of hostage knowingly of the risk of asset 
obsolescence that decreases the value to the hostage party. The hostage party is then 
subjected into a lock-in situation and cannot leave the relationship without sustaining 
economic loss, thus increasing incentives for partners in a dyad to act opportunistically.  
Some extant literature has discussed the three types of business opportunistic behavior 
namely; adverse selection, moral hazards, and hold-up (Berthon et al ,2003; Barney and 
Ouchi, 1988). 
Berthon et al, (2003), defines adverse selection as an ex ante opportunism that arises when 
there is information asymmetry prior to establishing an exchange agreement thus parties in 
the dyad cannot establish the true attributes that have impacts on their future performance. 
The pre-contractual evaluations of partners or goods can be an issue to address especially 
when one party of the exchange relationship lacks adequate resources and expertise to tackle 
down insufficient information before the agreement. This is evident in the insurance 
literature (Berthon et al ,2003; Barney and Ouchi, 1988). 
The other two opportunistic practices of moral hazard and hold-up situation arise ex post. In 
fact, moral hazard is ex post opportunism bred also from information asymmetry about the 
capabilities of an exchange partner with respect to the current environment. In fact, moral 
hazard can be defined as shortfalls in effort arising when individuals engage in risk sharing 
under conditions such that their privately taken actions affect the probability distribution of 
the outcome (Berthon et al ,2003; Holmstrom, 1979). 
Conversely, hold-up situation is ex post opportunistic behavior arising from unilateral 
idiosyncratic investment in an exchange relationship. The specific investments introduced 
in the exchange relationship act as bait, leading to dependence trap on an exchange partner 
that lead to small number conditions because of high switching costs (Rokkan, Heide and 
Wathne, 2003; Wathne and Heide, 2000; Berthon et al ,2003). 
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Forms and Outcomes of Opportunism 
Expounding on the early TCA works of Williamson (1985), Wathne and Heide (2000) have 
gone a step further in defining the two forms of opportunistic behavior i.e. active and passive 
opportunism, with the considerations as to whether either form take place within existing or 
new circumstances. 
Figure 4 gives an overview of the different faces opportunism takes and much of this is 
further explained in the upcoming subsection. 
 
Figure 4: Forms and Outcomes of Opportunism 
Source: Wathne and Heide (2000) 
From figure 4 above, cell 1 considers passive opportunism under existing circumstances 
perspective. Opportunistic behaviors entailed in these two prerequisites take the form of 
evasion of obligations and shirking such as non-compliance of quality standards by parties 
in a dyad.  Partners acting opportunistically aim to achieve cost saving, and this can only be 
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met in the short-term, at the expense of the exchange partner who incurs extra costs. In the 
long-run, there is customer dissatisfaction for the opportunistic party and this leads to 
reduced profits for both parties in the exchange system (Wathne and Heide, 2000). 
In cell 2, Wathne and Heide (2000) illustrate a scenario of passive opportunism under new 
circumstance. Opportunism here takes the form of refusal to adapt to new business 
circumstances. Here, there are minimal costs incurred because of lack of investments needed 
to support the exchange system. On the revenue side, however, the opportunistic partner 
benefits on the short term through increased revenue. In the long run, the exchange partner 
and the system feel the impact of opportunism through forgone revenues because of 
maladaptation. 
Cell 3 depicts active opportunism under existing circumstances. In this scenario, 
opportunistic behavior takes form of violation of previously laid down rules through breach 
of contracts. This leads to increased costs for the hostage as the relationship progresses. 
Moreover, revenue wise, the opportunistic partner achieves the desired goal of increased 
revenue, but only in the short-term. In the long-run, both the system and the hostage feel the 
negative effect of opportunism in their revenues through decreased incomes (Wathne and 
Heide, 2000). 
The last cell portrays active opportunism in arising circumstances. According to Wathne and 
Heide (2000), opportunism in this situation takes the form of forced renegotiation of the 
previously written contracts. This influences the weak exchange partner as he incurs 
increased costs brought about by haggling and concessions. The short-term revenue effect 
is positive to the opportunistic party and negative to the hostage partner. In the long-run 
however, both exchange parties are negatively impacted by the opportunistic behavior 
through decreased income caused by refusal to adapt. 
3.2.1.2 Bounded Rationality 
The second TCA assumption of ‘bounded rationality’ is a designation referring to the 
rational choice that accounts the cognitive limitations of decision makers in the exchange 
dyad in terms of knowledge and computational capacity (Simon, 1982). Rindfleisch and 
Heide (1997) further elucidate that it is the assumption that decision makers have constraints 
on their cognitive capabilities that affects their rationality in information processing and 
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communication ability. This assumption is not further discussed in the study, with focus 
given much on the opportunism aspect. 
3.2.2 Dimensions of a Transaction in TCA 
The dimensions of a transaction in TCA also play a vital role in supporting the theory. These 
include Asset Specificity, Uncertainty and Volume/ Frequency of Transactions. These 
dimensions are further expounded in the subsequent sub-chapters. 
3.2.1.1 Asset Specificity 
According to Rokkan, Heide and Wathne (2003), specific investments are important in 
marketing strategies and inter-firm relationships due to the value they add in a dyad. Ghosh 
and John (1999) assert that specific assets play key roles in realizing value propositions 
which give a party competitive advantages.  
 
Williamson (1985) defines asset specificity as durable, tangible and intangible investments 
that firms incur for the facilitation of transactions in an exchange relationship. Moreover, 
Buvik and Reve (2002); Rokkan, Heide and Wathne (2003) posit that they are assets that are 
uniquely dedicated for specific transactions out of task needs and goodwill and cannot 
therefore be redeployed to other uses without a significant loss in value, a character that 
brings up the question of opportunism by exchange partners through lock-in and dependence 
traps as receivers have the incentive to expropriate the investments’ values (Wathne and 
Heide, 2004). 
 
The aspect of specific investment not being able to be redeployed puts the focal receiver in 
a driving seat to expropriate the investments (Rokkan, Wathne and Heide, 2003). 
 
The subject of opportunistic behavior acts as a barrier for firms to invest in valuable assets 
in fear of expropriation, but still this dimension brings about controversy due to the 
considerable value they create that can improve co-ordination in an exchange relationship 
(Rokkan, Heide and Wathne, 2003). Furthermore, Rokkan, Heide and Wathne (2003) posit 
the specific investments pose a dilemma between remaining in the relationship and bear the 
opportunistic behavior and its costs or leave the relationship and pay significant amounts of 




Rokkan, Heide and Wathne (2003) further argue specific investments can have negative impact 
on opportunism through bonding effect especially if given the extent of returns is sufficiently 
productive. The effects of specific investment on the receiver depend on extendedness, which is 
the duration of the exchange relationship, and relational norms that tend to dilute opportunism 
towards bonding (Rokkan et al., 2003). 
 
Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) also argue that opportunism poses a problem to the extent that 
a relationship is supported by specific assets whose values are limited outside of the focal 
relationship by the focal recipient exploiting the situation by demanding various kinds of 
concessions from the investor. This has led to the notion that specific investment creates 
safeguarding problems (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; Wathne and Heide, 2000; Rokkan, 
Heide and Wathne, 2003). 
 
Heide and John (1988) have incorporated the dependence and TCA frameworks as the basis 
of how firms can eradicate the safeguarding problems while Rokkan, Heide and Wathne 
(2003) also incorporate relational norms as a basis of shifting from expropriation towards 
bonding. In fact, Heide and John (1988), Buvik and Haugland (2002) and Kvaløy (2003) 
suggest different forms of governance mechanisms as an effective way to deal with 
safeguarding problems arising from investments of specific assets in the notion that as asset 
specificity becomes more substantial, the form of governance should move from external 
market convention to hierarchy governance. 
Figure 5:Governance Mechanisms and Asset Specificity 
 
Source: Rossignoli (2015). 
Extant literature posits the various types of asset specificity including site specificity- that 
occurs when investments are made in close proximity to enhance efficient production in an 
exchange relationship, physical asset specificity- including equipment or machinery that 
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produce inputs specific to a particular customer or are specialized to use an input of a 
particular supplier, human-asset specificity – in terms of the accumulation of knowledge 
and expertise that is specific to one trading partner and dedicated assets- investments in 
general capital to meet the demand of a specific buyer. However, these are not specific to 
the buyer, except that if the specific customer decided not to purchase, the input supplier 
would have substantial excess capacity. (Church and Ware, 2000). Asset specificity in this 
study will be used to study the buyer opportunism and to what extent they effect the 
sugarcane famers’relations with the sugar millers. 
3.2.2.2 Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is a multidimensional concept considered as one of the most important factors 
in transaction costs theory and other organization theories; in fact, uncertainty has been a 
key issue for strategic decision makers in charge of sustaining the advantage of the firm over 
time (Sutcliffe and Zaheer, 1998; Vecchiato, 2012).  
 
Many scholars have time and again associated uncertainty with choice of governance forms 
for firms (Williamson, 1975; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Bergen et al, 1992). Uncertainty 
has however raised concerns on its impact on governance decisions among various scholars 
(Bergen et al, 1992). Extant literature has raised questions on the role of uncertainty found in 
TCA as a factor for influencing governance mechanisms and as a multidimensional concept, 
this may result in different organizational governance outcomes (Bergen et al, 1992).  In fact, 
strategic management scholars stress on uncertainty as a major factor affecting key strategic 
decisions of organizations (Sutcliffe and Zaheer, 1998). 
 
Williamson (1975) describes uncertainty as the inability of exchange parties to predict the 
future and its unforeseen occurrences. Williamson (1985) went further to clarify the two 
categories of uncertainties, i.e. environmental uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty.  
 
• Behavioral Uncertainty 
Behavioral uncertainty is the individual’s perceived inability to predict the future correctly 
(Milliken, 1987). Milliken (1987) further argues that individuals experience uncertainty due to 
insuffienct information to predict accurately or the inability to discriminate between relevant 
and irrelevant data. Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) postulate that behavioral uncertainty can be 
elucidated by opportunistic behavior of the economic agents and bounded rationality. In fact, 
this uncertainty arises from the difficulties associated with the monitoring of contractual 
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performance in the bresence of bounded rationality (Williamson, 1979). Williamson (1985) 
further expounds on the concept, referring to the exchange partners’ strategic, non-disclosure, 
disguise or distortion of information. Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) posit that an increase in 
behavioral uncertainty would lead to an increase in cost of evaluating the performance of an 
exchange partner. 
 
• Environmental Uncertainty 
Environmental uncertainty has over the years been a fundamental concept of strategic 
management and has thus been incorporated in the contingency theory, information process 
theory, theories of decision making and entrepreneurship theories (Chen, 2013). Environmental 
uncertainty is referred to as the unpredictability of the environmental or organizational variables 
that surrounding an exchange and have impact on corporate performances (Jie and Thongrattana, 
2009). Furthermore, Chen (2013) defines environmental uncertainty as the perceived lack of 
information on the aspects of the environment dictating a business’ performance in terms of 
unpredictability of the environment, the inability to predict the impacts of environmental change 
and the consequences of the opportunity cost taken. Milliken (1987) summarized the concept of 
environmental uncertainty as ‘an inability to assign probability as to the likelihood of future 
events, a lack of information about cause-effect relationship and inability to predict accurately 
what the outcomes of a decision might be. 
 
According to Vecchiato (2012) firms’ business environments are inherently volatile and this 
volatility creates uncertainty for rationally-bounded managers, since information about 
external changes is intrinsically difficult to collect, process and comprehend fully or when 
managers are not confident that they understand what the major events or changes in their 
business are and when they feel unable to predict something with pin-point accuracy.  
 
The organization management literature defines the environment in which a firm operates 
as micro environment and the macro environment, by distinguishing sectors with which the 
firm has direct contacts and which directly affect its business strategy from sectors that affect 
the firm indirectly (Dill, 1958; Vacchiato, 2012). The micro environment also known as 
environmental components includes competitors, customers, suppliers, potential incomers, 
substitute products and providers of complementary products while the macro environment 
(dimensions of environmental attributes) is made up of the political, economic, ecological, 




Environmental uncertainty has been defined as a multidimensional construct classified into 
three; state, effect and response uncertainty (Chen, 2013).  State Uncertainty is the inability 
to predict how the components of the environment are changing; Effect Uncertainty 
describes the inability to predict the impact of the dynamism of the environment of the 
company; and Response Uncertainty is described as the lack of insight into response options 
or the inability to predict consequences of a response choice in a volatile environment (Chen, 
2013). 
• Environmental Uncertainty and Opportunism 
 Williamson (1979) postulates that high environmental uncertainty enforces ex-ante problems 
of formulating comprehensive contracts that in turn result to adaptation problems. 
Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) postulate that environmental uncertainty’s concern is the 
adaptation problem with difficulties in modifying agreements to the ever-changing 
circumstances. Buvik and Grønhaug (2000) further assert that the dynamics of economy and 
technology pronounce uncertainty, leading to adaptation problems. Adaptation problems have 
been discussed as convenient grounds for opportunistic behavior and this means that parties in 
an exchange relationship may have to write very complex contracts covering all future 
uncertainties (Williamson, 1991). 
 
In the extant literature, scholars have argued that the associated transaction costs related to 
uncertainty and mitigation of adaptation problems include the direct costs of communicating 
new information, renegotiating agreements, or coordinating activities such as hybrid 
governance and vertical integration to reflect new circumstances. (Milliken, 1997; Artz & 
Brush 2000; Joshi and Stump, 1999). 
 
According to Lim et al (2014) firms face opportunism of their exchange partners under 
environmental uncertainty circumstances and have difficulty in expecting benevolence from 
them because the participating firms are unable to predict the dynamism of the external 
environments due to lack of information, knowledge and the human perceived limitation.  
 
Three environmental dimensions have been illustrated in the extant literature; environmental 
munificence, environmental dynamism, and environmental complexity, on the possible level 
of the application of opportunistic behavior in the environments which organizations operate 
(Aldrich, 1979; Chen, 2013; Baker, 2015).   Environmental munificence refers to the extent 
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in which the environment supports sustained growth; while environmental dynamism 
(turbulence) refers to the degree in which environmental components act as units of change 
and environmental complexity refers to environmental complexity as the heterogeneity of 
and range of an organization’s activities (Aldrich, 1979; Chen, 2013; Baker, 2015). 
 
Figure 6: Environmental Uncertainty and Dependence of Buyer 
 
   Source: Researcher’s own formulation based on extant literature (2017). 
 
According to figure 6, organizations are more likely to engage in opportunistic behavior as 
their power on other organizations increases (Baker, 2015).  Power and dependence 
reciprocate each other; hence this means that an organization which is highly dependent on 
another organization will try to avoid opportunistic behavior due to the inter-independence 
of organizations (Provan and Skinner, 1989; Heide, 1994).  
 
Cell 1 depicts a scenario of low dependence of buyer by the seller (farmers) and high 
environmental uncertainty. In this scenario, the opportunistic behavior of the buyer is 
expected to be moderate due to the low power-dependence relationships between the 
members in the dyad though the environmental uncertainty still makes room for one party 
to act opportunistically to some extent.  
 
Cell 2 depicts the scenario of high dependence of the buyer by the seller coupled with high 
environmental uncertainty. In this business environment, opportunistic behavior by the 
buyer is at the highest due to the power the buyer has over the seller (Emerson, 1962) and 
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the high costs associated setting up renegotiating agreements and coordinating activities 
(Williamson, 1991; Buvik and Grønhaug, 2000; Baker, 2015).  
 
Cell 3 is an environment where exchange partners operate in low environmental uncertainty 
and both buyer and seller are in a balanced power-dependence situation. In this scenario, it 
is expected to be the lowest buyer opportunism. This could best describe a competitive 
market structure where there are many buyers and sellers and the switching cost between 
parties is relatively low. 
 
Cell 4 describes the interplay between low environmental uncertainty and high dependence 
of the buyer by the seller. In this business environment, the seller has the incentive to behave 
opportunistically at the expense of the buyer, though the low environmental uncertainty 
dampens the power of the seller. Therefore, at this environment, moderate buyer 
opportunism is expected to prevail. 
3.2.2.3 Frequency of Transactions 
Frequency is the least straightforward in its influence on transaction costs, however cannot 
be ignored in the TCA framework. In fact, studies, such as Buvik and Grønhaug (2000) and 
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) have advocated this concept as an influence on firm’s efficacy of 
alternative inter-firm co-ordination mechanisms.  In fact, some scholars, such as Colbert and 
Spicer (1995) have combined both frequency and volume of transaction. This concept entails 
how often and how regularly transactions recur. Its influence on transaction costs has been 
discussed somewhat controversially in the literature (Verhaegen, 2002 and Groenewegen et 
al., 2010), with authors such as Rinsfleisch and Heide (1997) unable to confirm its 
hypothesized effects on transactions due to the limited number of studies on it. 
 
Williamson (1979), classified three frequency classes, that is one-time, occasional and recurrent 
frequencies of transactions. Extant literature posits the argument that frequency can cause 
transactions to be more of an arm’s-length character as well as more integrated in the events 
where standard transactions are repeated frequently between two exchange parties. As the 
relationship progresses, both have an incentive to not behave opportunistically as otherwise 
future profits from the repeat business will eventually diminish (Verhaegen, 2002 and 




On the contrary, Williamson (1985) and Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) argue that as frequency 
of transactions increase, opportunity costs arise under a market governance structures due 
to foregone efficiencies of the economies of scale of vertical coordination. In this line of 
argument, larger volumes of transactions incorporate the justification for more advanced 
structures of governance to reduce costs of transactions (Colbert and Spicer, 1995). Moreover, 
the cost of specialized governance structures is easier to recover for large and recurring 
transactions due to economies of scale in the transactions (Williamson, 1985; Buvik, 2000; 
Rindfleisch and Heide (1997). 
 
Williamson (1985) and Buvik (2000) have argued that asset specificity should be brought into 
the light of the frequency of transactions argument, bearing the economies of scale from the 
control and monitoring systems. 
 
Figure 7:Frequency of Transactions and Asset Specificity 
 
Source: Buvik (2000) 
 
 The interplay between low frequency of transactions and high specific assets in (figure 7) best 
suits the occasional purchasing of customized equipment. Buvik (2000) asserts efficacy 
problems in this interplay due to underutilization of governance structures. In cell 2, high asset 
specificity and high frequency of exchange is the best exchange scenario due to specialized 
governance efficacy that safeguards the specific investments (Buvik, 2000). In cell 3 low asset 
specificity with high transaction frequencies interplay is suitable for standardized products. Low 
asset specificity results to lesser opportunism hence market mechanism is the most efficient 
governance mechanism (Buvik 2000). The last cell tells a story of low asset specificity and low 
frequency of exchange. The low-low situation, Williamson (1985) and Buvik (2000) suggest 
independent transactions, with market governance the most efficient.  
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3.3 Relational Contracting Theory 
 
The relational contracting theory was pioneered by the works of legal scholars Macaulay 
(1963) and Macneil (1978). The basis of this theory is characterized by a view of contracts 
as relations rather than discrete transactions in the works of Macneil (1980). Furthermore, 
Macneil elaborated a set of relational behavioral norms that govern exchange relationships 
including role integrity, reciprocity, implementation of planning, effectuation of consent, 
flexibility, contractual solidarity, restraint of power, propriety of means (doing things the 
right way), the linking norms and harmonization with the social matrix (Macneil, 1980). 
 
In Macneil’s (1978, 1980) works, a relational contract is of uttermost importance if 
transactions are of long-term duration, personal interaction is crucial, and the future co-
operation opportunity is vital. In fact, Macneil (1983) further postulates that in discrete 
transactions and relational contracts, common contract norms become intensified as the 
relationship duration is lengthened and safeguard the relationship. Ozkan-Tektas (2014) 
argues that relational dimensions are difficult to develop, maintain and duplicate, and this 
gives the norms a competitive advantage in an unstable, risky and highly competitive 
environment.  
 
 More scholars have put forward measures of the extent of a relational contract such as co-
operation, organization culture, trust, good faith and contract duration, with trust being one 
of the cornerstones in quantification of norms (Williamson, 1979, 1985; Buvik and Halskau, 
2001). 
Trust has been defined as the confidence in an exchange partner ‘s reliability and integrity 
or the willingness to rely on a partner where one has confidence (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). 
Wood and McDermott (1999) define trust as willingness to rely on the action of others, to 
be dependent upon them, and thus be vulnerable to their actions.  The extant literature posit 
that the existence of trust reduces the need for contractual safeguarding against the future 
events. 
 
3.3.1 Inter-Firm Trust, Relational Norms and Opportunism 
Wathne and Heide (2000) posit norms and inter-firm trust stand as informal agreements even 
in the presence of formal contracts because formal contracts are time limited.  However, the 
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relational norms develop over time, and in the future act as cushion against opportunistic 
behavior in the exchange relations (Buvik and Halskau, 2001).  
 
Högberg (2002) elucidates that if both exchange parties in relationship refrain from 
opportunistic behavior and co-operate in a trustworthy manner they can improve the ability 
to take advantage of potentials for specialization and economies of scale as trust operates as 
a mechanism for managing the relationship. In fact, in the presence of inter-firm trust, 
partners have the incentives to devote more resources, energy, and time to maintain the 
relationship (Ozkan-Tektas, 2014). 
 
Ozkan-Tektas (2014) posits that opportunism is one of its most critical antecedents for the 
drive of trust. During intense competition, the focus of firms is directed on improving or at 
least maintaining their performance level through maximization of time, resources and 
investment to increase their payoffs, and these efforts may force them to behave 
opportunistic in their business exchanges which can strain the relationship (Ozkan-Tektas, 
2014).  In fact, exchange parties opt to opportunistic behavior in short-term relations or in 
early stages of the exchange relationship where the trust and other norms are still 
underdeveloped (Burki and Buvik, 2010; Ozkan-Tektas, 2014). 
 
In long-term business, the examination of opportunistic behavior is crucial since, it may 
seriously affect the strength of the relationship. However, given a longer exchange duration, 
trust and other relational norms become an important building block in eliminating 
opportunism that might have otherwise incur the parties’ high transaction costs because of 
monitoring the opportunistic behavior (Burki and Buvik, 2010; Wathne and Heide; 2000). 
RCT in the context of this study is expected to support the notion that trust over time reduces 
the incentive of partners acting opportunistically. 
 
Furthermore the relational norms are deemed as important recipes for maintaining stable and 
mutual interrelationships and create certain behaviors and code of conduct expected in a 
certain exchange relationship even in asymmetrical power-dependence relations that over 
time build on the relational norms and trust as cushions for counter-attacking  the 
opportunistic exploitations of the powerful parties in the exchange relations (Heide and 
John, 1992; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978 Buvik and Reve, 2002; Buvik and Halskau, 2001; 
Burki and Buvik, 2010).   
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On the contrary, the antecedents of opportunism under relational contracting have received 
virtually no attention in the extant literature (Carson et al. 2003). In fact, Carson et al (2003) 
argue that the relational contracting literature largely lacks a systematic examination of the 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities of relational contracting on par with the scrutiny directed 
toward formal contracting and other administered and market forms of governance. 
Moreover, Carson et al (2003) work concluded that relational governance mechanisms are 
not infallible and are subject to their own vulnerabilities vis-à-vis opportunism and the 
results suggest that ambiguity, rather than volatility (for formal governance), is the primary 
driver of opportunism in relational contracting exchange relations whereas the reverse is true 
in formal contractual regimes. 
3.4 Power-Dependency Theory 
The power dependence theory is a social exchange theory that was developed by Richard 
Emerson in the early 1960s. The dynamics of this theory are centered on power, power use, 
and power-balancing concepts, putting into the equation the concept of dependence 
(Emerson, 1962). Emerson (1962) posits mutual dependence brings parties together; 
therefore, they become more likely to form exchange relations for their sustainability. 
 
The theory further defines the reciprocation of power- dependence relations and how to 
balance the two aspects because the basis of power implicitly lies in the other party’s 
dependence (Emerson, 1962). Social relations are mostly characterized by mutual 
dependence between parties, that is A depends on B if he desired outcomes or goals are 
facilitated by actions played B and vice versa considering the virtue of mutual dependence. 
The theory further illustrates that the power of (A) over (B) is equal the dependence of (B) 
on (A) but inequalities in dependence bring about power imbalances causing conflicts and 
social change (Emerson, 1962). Therefore, the power exercised over another is directly 
linked to the level of dependency regarding their capabilities and responsibilities and the 
dependency tends to be more pronounced by factors of importance, scarcity and non- 
substitutability (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
 
The theory further illustrates that imbalances in structural power produce corresponding 
imbalances in exchange benefits that favors the less dependent actor in an exchange relation 




According to Emerson (1962), there is extensive literature based on power at both theoretical 
and empirical levels, but still there are misconceptions on the concepts of power, influence, 
dominance, submission, status and authority. 
 
Power has been described as a property of social relation rather than the attribute of the actor, 
driven by differences across alternatives (Emerson, 1962; Wolfe and Mc Ginn, 2005), as the 
potential to change the behavior of or overcome some level of resistance of a target (1957) 
or the deployment of means to achieve intended results (Cobb, 1984). 
 
The most common formulated five types of power include; coercive, that is through 
application of pressure and threats; reward power through the provision of incentives, 
legitimate power; that arises from contractual aspects; referent power, developing out of 
admiration of desire to be like someone else; expert power, which is the ability to influence 
behaviors of others because of the possession of special knowledge and skills and 
information power; arising from information asymmetry (French and Raven, 1960; 
Lunenburg, 2012). 
 
Emerson (1962) argues that reciprocity in power-dependence relations brings about the 
discussion of equality or inequality of power in a social relation. Two kinds of patterns, 
balanced and unbalanced relations arise. The reciprocity further leads to either power 
advantage (Pab - Pba is positive), a power disadvantage (Pab-Pba is negative); cohesion 
resulting from the dependences of the two parties and balancing the operations in structural 
changes to reduce power advantages (Emerson, 1962). 
 
3.4.1 Relative Power and Opportunism 
Most extant literature has typically addressed power in terms of the agent’s potential power. 
The concept of relative power arises from the argument that power agents may only be 
powerful on one social domain such as politics, economy, education, technology or others, 
and moreover the scope of their power limited to a few people, class or organizations and to 
specific actions. Despite agents exercising power, the notion of resistance from the 
dominated parties comes in the equation, therefore enacting counter-power, making the 




Two approaches of social processes have been used by Somech and Drach- Zahavy (2002) 
to bridge the gap between the relationship of power and influence behavior. The first aspects 
are role- making processes between a leader and subordinate stressing that subordinates are 
simply not passive but are proactive in altering their work environment (Somech and Drach- 
Zahavy, 2002).   
 
The second approach illustrates how power is gained and lost in reciprocal processes 
between leaders and subordinates due to the ties of mutual dependency between them, 
(Somech and Drach- Zahavy, 2002). Furthermore, power is not only a factor of the position 
one holds in an organization, but also relies on personal and interpersonal attributes (Somech 
and Drach- Zahavy, 2002), bringing about the reciprocity attribute of power. 
 
Buyer-supplier relationships are initiated to achieve significant performances and 
competitive advantages over rivals (Wang et al, 2012) and are one of the most important 
resources a company can have because organizations depend on input and output resources 
for their survival as open systems (Buvik and Grønhaug, 2000). In most business setups, the 
problem of co-operation tends to arise due to the conflicts of interest (Yaqub, 2009), leading 
to economic inefficiencies in a such relationship.     
 
The lack of self-sufficiency in the context of resources creates dependence on the parties 
controlling the resources; bringing a power a symmetry, prompting dominant partners to 
expect greater payoffs (Yaqub, 2009).                                            
3.5 Summary 
This chapter has discussed both Transaction Costs Analysis and Relational Contracting 
theory in the build-up of opportunism in the sugar industry in Egypt. TCA holds that specific 
investments and uncertainty enhance opportunism, while RCT asserts that as the duration of 
transaction increases, relational norms develop and act as cushion to combat opportunism. 





































CHAPTER FOUR - CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 laid down the theoretical blueprint for this chapter. This chapter illustrates the 
overview of the research conceptual model and the hypotheses derived and constructed on 
the basis the theories of Transaction Costs Economics and Relational Contracting Theory. 
The theories were used to develop both the dependent variable and independent variables as 
seen in the conceptual model in the following subsection and further elaborate the 
hypotheses based on relevant literature that is alignment with the theories mentioned in the 
preceding chapter. 
4.2 The Research Conceptual Model 
This study has developed a conceptual model with regards to the exploration of the 
antecedents to opportunism between sugar mills and sugarcane farmers’ relationship in the 
Egyptian sugar industry. The conceptual model empirically tests the effect of independent 
variables: environmental uncertainty (UNCERT) and supplier transaction-specific 
investment (SUPSPEC), which also are the variables making the two interaction effects with 
respect to buyer opportunism (BUYOPPORT) which is the dependent variable in the 
conceptual model. The other independent variable is relationship duration of sugar mills and 
sugarcane farmers (RELDUR). The model further incorporates two control variables; 
supplier’s work force (WORKFORCE) and supplier sales volume (SALESVOL).  
 
The conceptual framework of the study further posits the three main hypotheses and a sub-
hypothesis (H1, H2a, H2b, and H3) that are derived from the independent variables and the 
control variables to give a limelight of the research problem being studied. As per the study’s 
hypotheses, the researcher expects a positive association between the level of environmental 
uncertainty and buyer opportunism (H1) as depicted in Figure 8. Furthermore, the conceptual 
model entails two interaction effects (H2a and H2 b) suggesting the interplay of the 
introduction of supplier specific investments and the presence of the environmental 
uncertainty regarding buyers’ opportunism. Hypotheses (H2a) and (H2 b) show the two 
effects of idiosyncratic investments in the presence of environmental uncertainty, with 
hypothesis (H2a) suggesting that the investments will further enhance opportunism while 
hypothesis (H2 b) depicts the positive impacts the investments will have in reducing buyer’s 
opportunistic behavior.  
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Hypothesis 3 (H3) in the study postulates the relationship between relationship duration and 
its expected impact on the expected opportunistic behavior from the buyer. The proposition 
of this hypothesis expects a negative association between this control variable and the 
dependent variable of opportunism since as exchange relationships develop over time, trust, 
relational norms and the partners’ shared values emerge and these act as a cushion against 
the existing and arising opportunistic abuse that would result to asymmetrical dependence 
in the exchange relations. 
 
Furthermore, the study depicts the relationship between the supplier sales volume with 
respect to opportunism. This control variable is expected to have a negative association 
between the two variables a bigger supply volume translates to a strategic supplier for the 
buyer. This also extends to the second control variable which depicts the size of the supplier, 
whether large or small by incorporating the size of the work force of suppliers with respect 
to buyer’s opportunistic exploitation. A bigger supplier is thus expected to be of strategic 
importance to the buyer thus have a negative impact in the expected buyer opportunism. 
 
Figure 8:Research Conceptual Model 
 
Source: Researcher’s Own Formulation Based on Literature Review (2017) 
4.3 Research Hypotheses 
The previous sub-chapter has given an overview of the study’s hypotheses. This sub-chapter 
further elaborates on the hypotheses by expounding on the independent variables and control 
variables, all derived from the theories of transaction costs analysis theory (TCA) and 
relational contracting theory (RCT) with respect to the dependent variable of opportunism. 
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4.3.1 Dependent Variable 
• Buyer Opportunism 
Williamson (1975) defines opportunism as self-interest seeking with guile. Furthermore, 
Williamson (1985) argued that opportunism takes various forms such as lying, stealing, 
cheating and all kinds of deceit, with calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, 
obfuscate or confuse due to the subtle and devious nature of the economic man. According 
to Mysen and Svensson (2010) and Wathne and Heide (2000), opportunism can include 
partner behaviors that passively or actively exploit the relationship to their own advantage 
that can restrict value creation or can erode other exchange outcomes. Furthermore,  Wathne 
and Heide (2000) have argued of three classes of opportunism namely adverse selection, 
that arises from the insurance field, which represents ex-ante opportunism through 
purposeful withholding of information prior to a transaction initialization; strong form 
opportunism which is explicitly or implicitly breaching of contracts prior to the exchange  
relationship and moral hazard which is a passive form of opportunism caused when an exchange 
partner distorts information, disguises or misleads the other party in order to protect its own 
interest (John, 1984; Williamson, 1985).  
 
Barney and Ouchi, (1988) and Berthon et al ,2003 categorize opportunism as adverse selection 
–ex ante opportunism arising when there is information asymmetry prior to establishing an 
exchange relationship thus exchange parties cannot establish the true attributes that have 
impacts on their future performance; moral hazard – ex post opportunism arising from 
information asymmetry about the capabilities of an exchange partner with respect to the 
current environment; and hold-up –which arises from unilateral specific investments that create 
the potential for exploitation as a result of lock-in situations. 
Opportunism poses transactional hazards in exchange relationships, and this has hence given 
the opportunism construct special attention by many economics and marketing scholars 
(Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; Rokkan, Heide and Wathne, 2003). In accordance to this 
research, the opportunism construct has been fabricated to capture the degree to which the 
sugar mills (buyers) opportunistically exploit their suppliers (sugarcane farmers) through 
certain behaviors such as false promises, refusal of extensions services, price fixing and 
manipulation, false accusations and cheating through using altered weighing scale to the 
detriment of the farmers.  
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4.3.2 Independent Variables and Interaction Effects 
4.3.2.1 Environmental Uncertainty, Supplier Specific Investment and Buyer 
Opportunism 
• Environmental Uncertainty 
The concept of environmental uncertainty was coined by Noordewier (1990), defining it as 
‘unanticipated changes in circumstances surrounding an exchange. Moreover, Milliken 
(1987) summarized environmental uncertainty as ‘an inability to assign probability as to the 
likelihood of future events, a lack of information about cause-effect relationship and 
inability to predict accurately what the outcomes of a decision might be. Jie and 
Thongrattana (2009) further defined uncertainty as the unpredictability of the environmental 
or organizational variables that surrounding an exchange and have impact on corporate 
performances. Lim, Smith and Kim (2014) argue that there is a relationship between 
uncertainty and a lack of information and knowledge, cementing Milliken’s (1987) 
consideration of uncertainty based information asymmetry. 
 
High environmental uncertainty enforces ex-ante problems of formulating comprehensive 
contracts that in turn result into adaptation problems (Williamson, 1979). Moreover, 
Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) also postulate that environmental uncertainty’s concern is the 
adaptation problem with difficulties in modifying agreements to the ever-changing business 
circumstances.) The dynamics of economy and technology have escalated uncertainty, leading 
to adaptation problem (Buvik and Grønhaug, 2000). These adaptation problems resulting from 
environmental uncertainty have been discussed as prerequisites for opportunistic behavior and 
this means that parties in an exchange relationship may have to write very complex contracts 
covering all future occurrences (Williamson, 1991). In fact, Lim, Smith and Kim (2014) argue 
that since it is difficult to anticipate all possible future contingencies ex ante, ex post 
adjustment usually becomes necessary in volatile environments thus the volatility makes the 
exchanges more conductive toward opportunistic behavior and thereby increasing its 
probability of occurrence (Lim, Smith and Kim, 2014). 
 
To add on with, the adaptation problems have led to rising transaction costs in the forms of 
direct costs of communicating new information, renegotiating of existing agreements, or 
coordinating activities to reflect new circumstances and this further gives more ground for 
partners to act opportunistically (Milliken, 1997; Artz & Brush 2000). Furthermore, Williamson 
(1985) argues that volatility in exchange relationships makes exchanges more conductive 
toward opportunism and increases its probability of occurrence since volatility engenders a 
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need to renegotiate agreements to avoid mal-adaptation to the external environment. This 
leads to confrontation and non-cooperative bargaining inherent among self-interested parties 
(Williamson, 1985). The extant literature argues that in uncertain environments, firms are 
more likely to rely on formal enforcement mechanisms, such as elaborate contract for the 
dispute settlement and as a cushion for curbing opportunistic behavior by partners and less 
likely to rely on informal mechanisms, such as relational norms and shared values, which in 
turn has the risk of threatening the development of inter-firm relational governance and lead 
to loopholes in enhancing opportunism (Joshi and Stump, 1999; Lim, Smith and Kim, 2014). 
 
Following this reasoning in the literature review, the researcher argues that the presence of 
environmental uncertainty in the sugar mills and sugarcane farmers’ relationship is expected 
to enhance the former’s opportunistic behavior. Thus, this study hypothesizes that 
 
H1: There is a positive association between the level of environmental uncertainty and 
opportunism in the sugar mills-sugarcane farmers’ relationships. 
 
• Supplier Specific Investment 
The Positive Association of Asset Specificity on Opportunism  
According to Williamson (1985), specific investments are defined as durable, tangible and 
intangible investments that firms incur for the facilitation of transactions in an exchange 
relationship. The extant literature posit that they are assets that are uniquely dedicated for 
specific transactions out of task needs and goodwill and cannot therefore be redeployed to 
other uses without a significant loss in value, a character that brings up the question of 
opportunism by exchange partners through lock-in and dependence traps as receivers have 
the incentive to expropriate the investments’ values (Wathne and Heide, 2000; Buvik and 
Reve 2002; Rokkan, Heide and Wathne 2003). 
 
Rokkan, Heide and Wathne (2003) and Ghosh and John (1999) argue that specific 
investments are important in marketing strategies and inter-firm relationships due to the 
value they add in a dyad giving them competitive advantages. However, the aspect of the 
idiosyncratic investment not being able to be redeployed puts the focal receiver in a driving 
seat to expropriate the investments (Rokkan, Wathne and Heide, 2003).  
Moreover, Allen (2015) argues that the introduction of idiosyncratic investment brings about 
contractual difficulties as transactions involved are prone to exchange hazards and high 
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switching costs. This gives opportunistic parties to behave so due to the expropriation effect 
that comes with the specific investment. Allen (2015) further argues that the absence of asset 
specificity brings about discrete market contracting, where exchange parties to the contract 
may easily turn to other suppliers or buyers and write a new contract due to lower switching 
costs.  
 
Williamson’s (1979) framework assumes went a further step suggesting in all business 
environments uncertainty exists in some intermediate degree. In fact, Williamson (1979) 
further incorporates asset specificity and uncertainty, claiming that as the degree of 
uncertainty increases, it makes it more imperative that the parties devise a machinery to 
‘work things out’ such as specific investments—since contractual gaps will be larger and 
the occasions for sequential adaptations will increase in number and importance.  
 
Some studies have support the TCE notion that in the presence of increasing uncertainty 
with specialized assets causes a shift toward more hierarchical governance while uncertainty 
without asset specificity favors a market convention (Anderson, 1985; Santoro and McGill, 
2005; Buvik and Grønhaug, 2000).  
 
In fact, further studies suggest hybrid arrangements are expected to inefficient to handle 
substantial bilateral dependence caused by asset specificity and resource dependence when 
volatile environmental disturbances are present (Masten, 1984; Levy, 1985; Buvik and 
Grønhaug, 2000). The explanation is that when asset specificity becomes substantial, hybrid 
inter-firm arrangements become more vulnerable against external disturbances.  
 
Buvik and Grønhaug (2000) and Vita, Tekaya and Wang (2010) argue on the interaction 
effect of uncertainty and specific investments suggesting that uncertainty captures the degree 
to which ex-ante contractual costs and ex-post monitoring and enforcing costs are 
augmented by environmental and behavioral unpredictability, and upon the presence of asset 
specificity, the effect of uncertainty further pushes transactions away from the market and 
towards a vertical integration since uncertainty incentivizes expropriation when a party's 






Figure 9:The Positive Effect of Asset Specificity on Uncertainty in Relation to Opportunism 
 
Source: Researcher’s Own Formulation According to Literature Review (2017) 
 
Figure 9 above depicts the association between asset specificity and environmental 
uncertainty with their effect on opportunism. Cell 1 depicts a scenario of low uncertainty 
and high specific investment. From the extant literature, idiosyncratic investment is attached 
to the expropriation effect, regardless of the level of uncertainty. Therefore, in this scenario, 
the buyer has the incentive to behave opportunistically due to the high switching costs the 
supplier will incur if he was to terminate the exchange relationship.  
 
Cell 2 depicts a scenario of very high uncertainty and very high asset specificity. Due to 
arising adaptation problems and safeguarding problems resulting from the uncertainty and 
specific investments respectively, the supplier is expected to face the highest opportunistic 
behavior from the buyer. Here the level of dependence is high for the supplier due to the 
heavy investments incurred, putting him in a lock-in chokehold. 
 
Cell 3 illustrates the low uncertainty and low asset specificity scenario. According to Allen 
(2015), the absence of specific investment leads to the incentive of handling transactions via 
a market mechanism.  The interaction of both low levels of uncertainty and low asset 
specificity is expected to result in low opportunistic behavior due to low switching costs. 
 
Cell 4 shows the scenario of low specific investment in a highly volatile business 
environment. In this scenario, the supplier is faced with adaptation problems due to the 
inability to predict future events. Therefore, there are transaction costs incurred by the 
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supplier in the formulation of extensive contracts, which also tend to have loopholes that 
might result to intermediate levels of opportunism.  
  
Based on this reasoning, the study proposes the following hypothesis; 
H2 a: The association between environmental uncertainty and buyer opportunism is 
significantly increased when supplier specific investments are introduced. 
 
The Negative Association of Asset Specificity on Opportunism  
The preceding section has illustrated the safeguarding problems that arise with the 
idiosyncratic investments in buyer-seller relations that put parties in hold-up situations. 
However, asset specificity has been deemed very important in co-operating partners out of 
task needs and goodwill (Lui, Wong and Liu, 2009).  The extant literature further suggests 
appropriate governance structures based on the level of asset specificity to reduce the 
hazards of opportunism (Williamson, 1985; Anderson, 1992; Lui, Wong and Liu, 2009). 
 
Scholars such as Dyer and Singh (1998) and Rokkan et al., (2003) have treated asset 
specificity and a relation-specific asset as being profoundly the same. This can be argued 
from a Relation Exchange Theory relation-specific asset signal the desire for parties to invest 
in an endured relationship. Dyer and Singh (1998) and Rokkan et al (2003) argue that the 
idiosyncratic investments increase co-operation and transaction value of the partnership 
hence explaining the relationship between asset specificity and partnership performance. 
Rokkan et al. (2003) have included relationship extendedness (continuity) and solidarity 
norms as two moderators to resolve the TCA’s conflicting views on asset specificity. To add 
on, Lui, Wong and Liu (2009) have suggested that specific investments have a significantly 
and positive relationship with trust, which in turn has facilitated cooperative behavior, which 
enhanced satisfaction in a partnership.  
 
The work of Buvik and Haugland (2002) discuss of symmetric exposure of asset specificity 
through the argument of motivation, described as uncertain evaluation and ability of 
transacting parties (balanced dependence structure) to implement contractual safeguarding. 
Buvik and Reve (2002) further posit the concerns of inter-firm dependence as both the 
motivation and the ability to structure marketing relationships in a specific way in combating 
risks and reducing costs through various governance structures. Furthermore, Buvik and 
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Haugland (2002) argue that relation duration is important in officiating balanced dependence 
structures and relax the need for safeguarding mechanisms.  
 
According to Buvik and Reve (2002) the deployment of specific assets adds value that 
should provide more advantageous trade conditions for the transacting parties such as 
reductions in production cost and/or better product performance/ quality) than that which 
conventional market transactions would provide. This therefore makes the suppliers very 
valuable and in such typical fashion be of accreditation to the relationship. In this instance, 
if the supplier employs substantial specific assets by tailoring his production process (for 
instance adherence to quality, quantity and lead time) to the special needs of the buyer, it 
will be establishing substantial bilateral dependence to this buyer (Buvik and Reve, 2002). 
This situation therefore might reduce the buying firm’s motivation to act opportunistically 
towards the supplier even in the existence of the ability to do so.   
 
In fact, extant literature such as Williamson's (1985) original framework talk on 
relationships characterized by reciprocal specific investments as an additional safeguard 
device against opportunism. The argument is that reciprocal investments can signal a 
credible commitment by both parties in an exchange relationship and, hence, reduce the 
trading hazard that can arise from idiosyncratic investments through the creation of a 
symmetrical mutual reliance relation (Williamson, 1985). Rokkan et al. (2003) have 
included relationship extendedness (continuity) and solidarity norms as two moderators to 
resolve the TCA’s conflicting views on asset specificity.   
 
Inderst and Wey (2007) found out that powerful buyers may reduce the supplier’s profits, 
though argue that the supplier’s incentives to undertake certain types of product or process 
innovation could in fact increase putting in mind that the suppliers intend to reduce 
increasing production costs and enhance exchange efficiency by investing in specific 
investments. 
 
• The Ability and Motivation Argument on Asset Specificity and Opportunism 
Moreover, the ability and motivation argument has been put forward as support for asset 
specificity having negative effects on opportunism in exchange relationships (Buvik and 
Andersen, 2002).  The argument of ability is that the buyer has relative power to the supplier 
in a monopsony market situation (sole buyer and many suppliers) resulting from multiple 
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sourcing resulting to less dependence on a sole supplier (Buvik and Andersen, 2002). 
Moreover, in this multiple sourcing situation, the buyer’s ability to assess and evaluate 
suppliers’ performance is pronounced and acts as a safeguard for opportunistic behavior 
from sellers. This sort of relative power resulting from multiple sourcing and asset 
specificity is a catalyst to opportunistic behavior (Emerson, 1962; Wathne and Heide, 2000; 
Buvik and Grønhaug, 2000). 
 
On the other hand, is the subject of the motivation argument. Specific investments bring 
safeguarding problems along with them, but also add value to an exchange relationship. 
Dyer and Singh (1998) and Rokkan et al (2003) argue that the idiosyncratic investments 
increase co-operation and transaction value of the partnership hence explaining the 
relationship between asset specificity and partnership performance. If partnership 
performance is vital for the continuity of the business relationship, then the buyer’s 
opportunistic behavior will tend to dampen to keep the strategic supplier in the equation. 
 
 Furthermore, Anderson (1992) argues that specific investments stabilize relationships by 
altering firms’ own incentive structure by realigning their self-interests despite their ability 
to be expropriate their partners. The bonding effect therefore brought about by the 
investments tends to lower the powerful parties’ motivation to act opportunistically (Buvik 
and Reve, 2002; Rokkan et al, 2003). 
 
In the light of the above argument, this study further hypothesizes the following; 
 
H2 b: The association between environmental uncertainty and buyer opportunism is 
reduced when supplier specific investments are introduced. 
 
• Relationship Duration 
Extant literature regarding relational contracting theory advocates continuous relationships 
between exchange parties is a vital element that fosters businesses’ desired outcomes 
(Anderson, 1995; Dwyer et al., 1987).  Moreover, Ozkan-Tektas (2014) cements the 
preceding notion by claiming business partners should distinguish themselves by creating 
strong relationships that create value in the globally competitive environment. RCT theorists 
further denote that since relational dimensions are not easy to develop, maintain, and 
duplicate, they become strategic tools of competitive advantage in business relationships 
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especially under unstable, risky, and highly competitive environment (Ozkan-Tektas, 2014; 
Barry, Dion, and Johnson, 2008). 
 
Heide (1994), notes that many exchange relations are governed by formal contracts as form 
of governance mechanism to combat unforeseen exchange hazards. However, as more 
interactions occur between the parties, relationships start to nurture, and over time relational 
norms, trust and shared values develop and act as a form of governance. (Ozkan-Tektas, 
2014; Buvik, Andersen and Grønhaug, 2014; Heide and John, 1990; Macneil, 1980). These 
relational norms, to RCT theorists, are deemed as vital recipes for maintaining stable and 
mutual interrelationships and create certain behaviors and code of conduct expected in a 
certain exchange relationship (Heide and John, 1992; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The 
developed shared norms such as trust, honesty and integrity therefore act as a cushion of 
counteracting arising opportunistic exploitations of the exchange parties (Buvik and Reve, 
2002; Buvik and Halskau, 2001; Buvik and Burki, 2010).  
 
Morgan and Hunt (1994) argue that the most driver of trust in exchange relationships is 
opportunism that arises due to intense competition, hence each exchange party tries to 
maximize its time, resources and investment, and incline themselves opportunistically at the 
expense of their partners hence strain the relationship. Ozkan-Tektas (2014) also argues that 
the examination of opportunistic behavior is vital in long-term business relationships rather 
than for individual transactions, since through its interactions with other relational constructs 
such as trust and commitment that strengthens the relationship in the long-run with focus on 
continuity of conducting business transactions. Considering the literature review and the 
preceding discussion, the prior length of relationships attenuates adversarial tendencies in 
exchange relationships due to social bonds created from personal relationships between 
exchange parties. In light with this argument, the researcher expects that that sugarcane 
farmers who have been in a longer buyer-seller relationship with the sugar mills perceive 
the latter as being less opportunistic due to the accrued relational norms and shared values. 
Therefore, this study proposes the following hypothesis; 
H3: There is a negative association between longer relationship duration between 
sugarcane farmers and sugar mills and the buyers’ opportunism. 
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4.3.3 Control Variables 
This study incorporates two control variables in the conceptual model namely Supplier Sales 
Volume (SALESVOL) and the Size of the Supplier depicted by the suppliers’ work force 
(WORKFORCE).  
 
• Supplier Sales Volume  
Supplier sales volume in the conceptual model refers to the annual amount of sugarcane 
sales by the sugarcane farmers to the buyer (sugar mills). Sales volume is expected to 
influence opportunism negatively. Supplier sales volume denote the annual needs of the 
sugar mills, and relatively higher sales volume translates to ‘supplier power’ as relationships 
are characterized by asymmetric interdependences (Anderson and Weitz, 1989). As argued 
by the researcher, high volumes of sales by the farmers are expected to be a driving force in 
the sugar mills achieving their production targets, hence playing an important role in 
dampening the opportunistic behavior of sugar mills. 
 
• Firm Size of Suppliers 
According to Guldbrandsen and Haugland (2000), firm size is a crucial variable and plays 
important roles in shaping exchange relationships. According to Williamson (1985), larger 
firms tend to easily integrate compared to small firms due to their high economies of scale. 
Furthermore, large firms are more likely to develop close personal and social ties with their 
trading partners than small ones, thus negatively impacting opportunistic behavior of the 
buyers. Large firms also possess influential power thus getting preferential treatment from 
their exchange partners compared to small ones. In this study, the size of the supplier is 
depicted by the work force (number of workers employed by a sugarcane farmer or 
institution). Accordingly, this study claims that the size of the supplier is negatively 
associated with buyer opportunism. 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter presented an overview of the research model and hypotheses. The development 
of the research model and the hypotheses at hand were formulated in accordance to the 
literature review on transaction costs analysis (TCA) and relational contracting theory 
(RCT). Four hypotheses were formulated, with one interaction effect between environmental 
uncertainty and asset specificity, and two control variables of supplier work force and 
supplier sales volume. Discussion on independent control variables has also been presented. 


















































CHAPTER FIVE - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the study’s methodology used in this study. The chapter shows how 
the researcher approached the study by elaborating the research design and data collection 
methods and techniques used. It also discusses the population of interest, sampling 
procedure, as well as the sampling size. 
5.2 Research Design 
Research design is a systematic master plan for used when conducting a scientific study 
within qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods approaches that provides a specific 
direction for procedures in a research (Williams, 2007; Creswell, 2014).  Research design 
can be viewed as a plan that offering connectivity between the conceptual research problems 
to the pertinent empirical research through articulating required data, data collection, data 
analysis to answer the research questions at hand (Burns and Grove, 2005; Creswell, 2014). 
Kothari (2004) points out an appropriate research design should entail five of the following 
factors; (1) the means of obtaining information; (2) the availability and skills of the 
researcher and his staff, if any; (3) the objective of the problem to be studied; (4) the nature 
of the problem to be studied; and (5) the availability of time and money for the research 
work. 
Depending on the purpose, research design can be classified as descriptive, exploratory, or 
causal and effects designs (Churchil and Brown, 2004; Creswell, 2014). Descriptive design 
is majorly concerned with description of a behavior or type of a subject or relationships 
between two variables. Exploratory designs or formative research designs deals with 
discovery of new ideas and insights. The causal research design is pertinent to causes and 
effect relationships (Kothari, 2004). The extant literature posits research design can be either 
cross-sectional (one-time research) or longitudinal based on a time point-of-view (Malhotra and 
Birks, 2006; Kothari, 2004).  Cross-sectional research is confined to a single-time whereas 
longitudinal research is based on several time series (Kothari, 2004).  
 
5.2.1 Cross Sectional Research Design 
This study incorporates both qualitative and quantitative techniques of research designs, 
which are under a cross-sectional research based on the duration. The qualitative research 
aspect tests the preceding theories by examining the relationship among variables that can 
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be measured on instruments to allow numerical data to be analyzed through statistical 
procedures (Creswell, 2014).  
 
Cross-sectional research is confined to a single-time whereas longitudinal research is based 
on several time series (Kothari, 2004).  In fact, this type of research study selects its entire 
population or a subset and the concerned individuals from where the data is collected helps 
answer the research questions at hand (Olsen, 2004).  This research design is termed as 
cross-sectional because the information gathered represents what is going on at only one 
point in time as compared to the longitudinal design and also is used in identifying the degree 
of association between the X and Y variables in a research model through the administration 
of questionnaires in surveys (Levin, 2006; Churchill and Brown, 2004; Sedgwick, 2014).  
 
Therefore, the rationale of employing a cross-sectional research design in this study was 
time and financial constrain factors as these research design studies are generally quick, 
easy, and relatively cheap to perform compared to other research designs (Sedgwick, 2014).  
 
Cross sectional research design has however received criticism for its shortcomings.  Firstly, 
this research design cannot be employed in the analysis of a behavior over a certain duration 
of time. Moreover, this snapshot design does not determine cause and effect, but rather 
establish a direction of influence of the study through the proposed hypotheses (Glavee- 
Geo, 2012; El Meladi, 2016).  
5.3 Data Sources  
The data in this study is concerned with both primary and secondary collected data that is 
used in the hypothesis test, to achieve scientific address. The researcher conducted a survey 
with the help of a questionnaire as a data collection instrument to gather primary data from 
the sugarcane farmers that has been analyzed in the study. In fact, Creswell argues that 
questionnaires or structured interviews are best for data collection with the intent to draw 
conclusions for the whole population based on the findings from the sample collection. The 
researcher randomly selected the sample of sugarcane farmers based in Upper Egypt to fill the 
questionnaires. A questionnaire can be administrated by mail, telephone or in person through 
the face-to-face interview (Churchill, 1999), however the researcher opted a face-to-face 




The secondary data is also important in the study and has been a blueprint in developing 
theoretical perspectives and the conceptual framework as seen in the preceding chapters 3 
and 4 respectively. Furthermore, the secondary data has given an insight of the 
operationalization of the relations between farmers and the respective buyers of the Egyptian 
sugar industry. The main secondary data sources used in the study include journal articles 
relating to transaction costs analysis, relational contracting and power dependence theories 
and the sugar industry publications relating to both Egypt and the world at large, conference 
papers, specifically on the Egyptian sugar industry; industry annual reports such as reports 
from United States Department of Agriculture from various years and some annual reports 
from the Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture pertaining on production, consumption and 
import and exportation of sugar, books relating to the sugar industry, research methods and 
data analysis, online sources such as websites (from the government and different sugar 
companies in Egypt) and daily news articles from various domestic and international outlets 
that addressed the Egyptian sugar industry. 
5.4 Population, Sampling Frame, Sample Size  
Kothari (2004) argues that a researcher must decide the sample design, which is a definite 
plan before data collection. Churchill and Brown (2004) define the five steps in sampling 
designs selection as follows (1) definition of the population in question; (2) selection of the 
sampling frame; (3) selection of sampling procedures; (4) choosing the sample size; and (5) 
selection of the sample elements.  
5.4.1 Population of the Study 
Kothari (2004) posits that all items under a study consideration constitute a universe or 
population. Population is the totality of cases that conform to some designated specifications 
(Churchil and Brown, 2004).  
 
This population in this study consists of all licensed sugarcane farmers in Upper Egypt. 
There are no specific reports or databases of the exact number of the registered farmers from 
the various government institutions. The researcher has employed a list some of farmers 
selling to the sugar factories operating in Upper Egypt towns of Aswan, Qena, Sohag, Luxor 
and Assiut, with the highest concentration of sugarcane growers in the country.   
5.4.2 Sampling Frame   
Sampling frame according to Kothari (2004) is defined as a list containing sampling units 
which form the basis of sampling process. Turner (2003) defines sampling frame as a set of 
51 
 
source materials from which the sample is extracted. Moreover, a sampling frame is a list of 
all population elements from which a sample is drawn (Churchill and Brown, 2004). A 
sample frame also provides quantitative information for estimation of population parameters 
based on sample observations. According to Saunders et al (2009), the sampling frame 
should be accurate, updated and complete prior to the research process.   
 
Accuracy is a vital characteristic for a sample frame.  A frame can be said to be 
characteristically accurate if each member of the target population is included once in the 
frame. Moreover, a frame should be current in order for it to fulfill the other two properties 
of completeness and accuracy while the attribute of completeness means the frame would 
be complete with respect to the target population if all of its members (the universe) are 
covered by the frame. (Turner, 2003) Frame coverage is therefore an essential feature in 
judging whether it is suitable for a survey or, if not, whether it can be repaired or further 
developed to make it suitable. (Turner, 2003; Saunders et al, 2009). 
 
Once the sampling frame is established, the choice of sampling designs based on the 
selection procedures is then employed. The extent literature categorized sampling 
procedures into two kinds, that is probability sampling and non-probability (Henry, 1990; 
Kothari, 2004).   
 
Probability sampling is also termed as random or chance sampling. Churchil and Brown 
(2004) argue that probability sampling assumes that each of the target population in the 
previous method has a non-zero chance to be included in the sample. The elements in the 
universe have an opportunity of being included in the sample, and the mathematical 
probability that any one of them will be selected can be calculated. Moreover, Kothari (2004) 
further posits probability sampling as a blind chance or lottery method where individuals are 
picked by a mechanical or mathematical process.  
 
Random sampling technique has been considered as crucial in selection of representative 
samples.  This is due to the implication of equal probability or chance of individuals getting 
selected as all choices are independent and also possible sample combination an equal 
probability of being chosen. In fact, probability sampling results in high external validity 
compared to the non-probabilistic procedures (Crano et al, 2014). Probability sampling 
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comprises of four classifications: simple random sampling; stratified random sampling; 
systematic random sampling; and cluster sampling (Kothari, 2004).  
Simple random sampling: In this sampling method, a researcher develops a sampling frame, 
then selects elements from the sample frame according to a mathematically random 
procedure, and then locates the exact element that was selected for inclusion in the sample. 
This method is most applicable in cases of very small and homogenous populations.  
 
Stratified Random Sampling: This is a sampling technique where the population embraces 
several distinct categories, the frame can be organized into separate strata. The strata are 
sampled, each as an independent sub-population, out of which individual elements can be 
randomly selected. All elements in each stratum have equal chance of being selected. 
(Kothari,2004). 
 
Systematic Random Sampling: Kothari (2004) elucidates systematic random sampling 
practically by using a structured list to select the items or the required population. This 
sampling relies on arranging the target population according to specific ordering schemes 
such as numerical or alphabetical and then picking up elements at regular intervals from the 
structured list. Thus, in systematic random sampling only the first unit is selected randomly, 
and the remaining units of the sample are selected at fixed intervals. (Kothari, 2004).   
 
Cluster Sampling: Cluster sampling technique or two-stage sampling involves selecting 
sample areas, then selecting a sample of respondents from the sample areas. (Kothari, 2004). 
The population is divided into clusters of homogeneous units, based on geographical basis. 
 
The second sampling design is non-probability sampling which is a procedure which does 
not afford any basis for estimating the probability that each population item has of being 
included in the sample. It is also known as deliberate sampling, purposive sampling and 
judgement sampling (Kothari, 2004). In this type of sampling, items of the population are 
selected deliberately by the researcher thus some elements of population stand no chance of 
selection. Due to the non-randomness of selection of elements, this type of procedure does 
not allow the estimation of sampling errors. Moreover, non-probability sampling techniques 
can be classified into: convenience sampling; judgmental sampling; and quota sampling 
(Kothari, 2004).  
53 
 
Thus, the sample frame for this study consists of registered farmers of sugarcane in the 
Upper Egypt region from the towns of Aswan, Qena, Sohag, Luxor and Assiut, specifically 
those that sell to the Kom Ombo factory, consisting of 681farmers (Abdel-Mawla.,2012). 
The list of 681 farmers was obtained from a hard copy register from the Kom Ombo factory 
kept as a reference of the transactions that took place between the farmers and the sugar mill. 
Thus, this research has employed a simple random sampling technique in chosen 
representative sample in selecting the sample size from the sample frame of 681 sugarcane 
farmers from the Kom Ombo sales register. 
5.4.3 Sample Size  
Extant literature posits sample size as the number of items to be selected from the universe 
(Kothari, 2004; Churchil and Brown, 2004). To add on, Kothari (2004) argues that sample 
size is a major problem before a researcher. Moreover, the size of sample should be 
optimum, i.e. neither should it be excessively large, nor too small, as it fulfills the 
requirements of efficiency, representativeness, reliability and flexibility (Kothari, 2004).  In 
fact, authors such as Hussey and Hussey (1997) point out that the sample size depends on 
the research, the expected level of confidence for the answers and the expected response 
rate. Furthermore, the sample size also depends on the power of the study, expected effect 
size, underlying event rate in the population and the standard deviation in the population 
(Kadam and Bhalerao, 2010). Scholars such as Schumaker and Lomax (2004) suggest a 
sample size of at least 100, while others like Hair et al (2006) state a sample size between 
100 to 150.  
Van Voorhis and Morgan (2007) posit the general rule of thumb is not less than 50 
participants for a correlation or regression with the number increasing with larger numbers 
of independent variables. Green (1991) suggests a comprehensive breakdown of the 
procedures used to determine regression sample sizes, suggesting N > 50 + 8 m (where m is 
the number of Independent Variables) for testing the multiple correlation and N > 104 + m 
for testing individual predictors. Hattie (1985) also argues that the number of participants 
should exceed the number of predictors by at least 50 (i.e., total number of participants 
equals the number of predictor variables plus 50) ‐‐a formula aligned with Greenʹs (2001) 
argument above. 
 
This study employed a total of 5 independent variables, thus the minimum sample based on 
criterion (a) is 50+8*5 = 90, however the researcher targeted a total of 120 respondents to 
foster adequate representative responses for analysis of the conceptual model. 
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5.5 Questionnaire Development  
Diem (2002) points prerequisites in the development of effective questionnaires. The 
researcher should determine the purpose of the study, what the researcher is going to 
measure and the measurement scale (Diem, 2002). During the questionnaire development 
process, the latent constructs and their corresponding variables were developed based on an 
intensive theoretical literature review from TCA, RCT and Power-Dependence theories 
whilst incorporating the prerequisites of the questionnaire development and construction. 
Moreover, the researcher based the questionnaire development questions by referring to 
some few sugarcane-growing farmers from Egypt for their insight about the on-going 
situation and the various challenges facing the farmers in the sugar supply chain to come up 
with precisely effective questions.  
 
Furthermore, more inputs from the thesis supervisor who is an experienced researcher was 
incorporated. and a pre-test by a few farmers. At this stage, the researcher focused on the 
content validity such questionnaire structure, readability, ambiguity and completeness 
(Dillman, 1978).  
 
The questionnaire was first constructed in English language and later translated to Arabic 
by a professional native Arabic language translator with a PhD in English linguistics studies. 
The main purpose of translating the questionnaire to Arabic from English was to curb the 
language barrier problem for the respondent farmers without the English background and 
skills.  
The latent constructs in the questionnaires were based on a 7-point likert scale, with 1= 
‘strongly disagree’ to 7=’strongly agree’ with regard to sugarcane farmers’ exchange 
relations with their most relevant sugarcane buyers. Furthermore, the questionnaire was 
stratified into 3 major parts. Part 1 consisted of questions gathering background information 
of the farmers and their major supplier. Part 2 consisted of independent variables relevant to 
the conceptual framework and were measured in the 7-point likert scale. The last category 
comprised of single item measures and both open-ended and closed general questions 
designed to capture some aspects of the dyadic relations between the farmers and sugar mills. 
5.5.1 Data Collection Techniques 
According to Kothari (2004), there are several methods of collecting primary data for 
surveys and descriptive researches. The most commonly used include; (i) observation 
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method, (ii) interview method, (iii) through administering questionnaires, (iv) through 
schedules, and (v) other methods which include using available information such as (a) 
information on warranty cards; (b) distributor audits; (c) pantry audits; (d) consumer panels; 
(e) using mechanical devices; (f) through projective techniques; (g) depth interviews, and 
(h) content analysis (Kothari, 2004; Peersman, 2014).  
 
Data collection for this research was mainly conducted through survey with questionnaire 
as the main data collection instrument. A questionnaire can be administered in various ways 
such as mail, telephone or in person through face-to-face interview (Churchill, 1999). In this 
study, the questionnaires were administered by the researcher through face-to-face 
interviews for a higher response rate as there is still an underdeveloped information and 
communication infrastructure in the rural Upper Egypt that bring about higher costs 
especially when using lengthy telephone interviews.  
 
The researcher visited sugarcane famers from the period of 17 January to 28 February 2017, 
holding face-to-face interviews with either the owners or managers of the farms whom have 
sufficient knowledge on their exchange relationships with their most relevant buyers of raw 
sugarcane. The process went relatively smoothly due to rapport building with the farmers 
prior to going to the field. 
 
• Response Rate 
Malhotra and Birks (2006) posit face-to-face interviews have very high response rates. 
Therefore, in this study the respondents were asked to fill a questionnaire form about at the 
presence of the researcher who further elaborated on the opportunism aspect regarding 
independent variables in question during the personal interviews (see Appendix 1). Thus, 
the response rate for this study was 100% where 120 forms were passed to 120 respondents 
that were targeted.    
5.4 Summary 
In this chapter, the study’s methodology was presented elaborating in detail the research 
design, sources of data, and data collection criteria. Moreover, the population, sampling 
frame, sample size and sampling procedures in the study were discussed. Finally, 
questionnaire development and data collection techniques have also been discussed in this 
chapter. The upcoming chapter will focus on the definition and operationalization of 

























CHAPTER SIX - DEFINATION AND OPERATIONALIZATION OF 
VARIABLES 
 
6.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, there are three sections will be present. The first section shows measurement 
theory. The second section displays the development of measurement model, and the third 
section discusses operationalization of variables and its definition. All perceptual items in 
this study have been adopted from previous studies and modified due to fit this context. 
6.2 Measurement Theory 
Measurement is defined by Stevens (1946) as, “the assignment of numerals to objects or 
events according to rules". Furthermore, Edwards and Bagozzi (2000, p.156) identify a 
measure as “an observed score gathered through self-report, interview, observation, or some 
other mean”. 
  
As Gerbing and Anderson point out, (1988), that in all branches of sciences; measurement 
is a central activity that quantifies the perception of interest. A theory is considered complete  
if it tested (De Vellis, 2003). Therefore, for testing a theory, measurement presents an 
experimental estimate for each theoretical construct of interest. Moreover, as (Bagozzi and 
Phillip, 1982) point out, that the theory is involved two parts, one that determining the 
associations between theoretical construct, and another that elaborates the relationships 
between constructs and its measures where construct can be defined as “an abstract term 
that attempts to describe a phenomenon” (Edwards and Bagozzi, 2000, p.157). However, 
this phenomena or event cannot be observed directly (Byrne, 2010). 
 
Therefore, a phenomenon is called a latent variable and it has two characteristics; one is 
“latent rather than manifest” which is not directly observable, second, is the construct which 
“variable rather than constant” so that means it can be varied according to specific factors 
like people, time and place (De Vellis, 2012). Accordingly, in order to examine and 
investigate the relationships between the constructs, the constructs need to be measured. 
Therefore, it is very important to know the relationship between constructs and measures as 
they are providing a supplementary theory that connects the gap between the measurable 
observed phenomena and the abstract theoretical constructs. 
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Thus, all the constructs in this conducted study are operationalized based on the 
recommendations from Churchill (1979), which display the guidelines for designing 
measures of constructs that used in this study. Therewith, all measurement items that used 
in this context were adapted and modified from previous research. Specially, multi-item 
scales which recommended by Churchill (1979), to reduce the measurement difficulties and 
to increase the reliability as well as reduce the measurement error. Hence, that multi-items 
were used herein to operationalize all latent constructs except for the annual workforce that 
determines the size of the supplier and the relationship duration were operationalized using 
single items scales (Gardner et al; 1998). Furthermore, as Rokkan et al, (2003), point out all 
single items scales will not be subjected to validity tests as on contrary for multi items scales.   
6.3 Measurement Model 
According to Bollen and Lennox (1991), there are differences between indicators that are 
“effects” of a latent construct (reflective indicators) and indicators that are “causes” of a 
latent construct (formative indicators). Therefore, it is very important to identify the latent 
variable very correctly and recognize its actual concept and nature to determine to which 
measurement model the latent variable and their measures should relate (Coltman et al, 
2008; Hair et al., 2010). Extant literature informs that there are three theoretical aspects in 
deciding whether the measurement model is formative or reflective as follows: (1) the nature 
of the construct, (2) the direction of causality between the indicators and the latent construct, 
and (3) the characteristics of the indicators used to measure the construct (Coltman et 
al.2008).  
 
Furthermore, based on these three aspects; the nature of the construct in the reflective model, 
is subsisting independently of the measures. In contrast, in the formative model is dependent 
upon a constructivist. The second aspect, the direction of causality; in the formative model 
causality direction flows from the indicators to the construct. On the other hand, the causality 
direction flows in the reflective model from the construct to the indicators (see figure 10). 
Finally, the Characteristics of indicators, there are a Significant differences characteristic of 
the indicators that measure the latent constructs under reflective and formative scenarios. As 
for the formative model, the indicators identify the construct, therefore, it is sensitive for the 
domain of the construct to determine the number and types of indicators that representing 
the construct.  However, deleting or adding an indicator can change the conceptual domain 
of the construct (Rossiter, 2002; Bollen and Lennox 1991).  
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In contrast, in the reflective model, any change in the latent variable should precede variation 
in the indicators. Therefore, all the indicators have the same theme and are interchangeable 
(Churchill, 1979; Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994). However, few cases of the formative 
model have seen in the business literature (Mackenzie and Jarvis et al, 2003). As in this 
conducted study, all the constructs have been operationalized and measured as reflective 
scales.  
 
Figure 10:Measurements Model 
   
 
Source: Coltman et al; (2008) 
6.4 Measurement Process 
This section presents all the variables that included in this study, as well as shows a brief 
definition of each variable, and all its question items that make up for each latent variable. 
This study has one dependent variable which is buyer opportunism (BUYOPPOR) and three 
independent variables: supplier specific investment (SSPI), environmental uncertainty 
(ENVIRO UNCERT), relationship duration (DURAT); and two control variables: annual 
sales volume (SUP SAL VOL) and annual workforce (Size of Supplier). 
 
6.4.1 The Dependent Variable 
 
• Buyer Opportunism 
 In this study, the dependent variable is buyer opportunism which is the sugar mills in Egypt, 
whereby this dependent variable is affected by the other independent variables which are 
mentioned above. The author has asked questions about this underlying construct based on 
the extant literature review (Provan and Skinner, 1989; Moore and Cunningham, 1999; 
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Knemeyer and Murphy, 2005; Gundlach et al. 1995), as well as the empirical data collected 
in the initial phase of data collection. The construct consists of six items that were adopted 
and modified from the previous study to fit this context, using a 7- point likert scale from 1 
= 'strongly disagree' to 7 = 'strongly agree'. Thus, the upcoming items have been used to 
measure the buyer opportunism from the seller's prospective. The items are presented in 
table 1. 
Table 1: Questionnaire items for Buyer Opportunism 
BUYOPPOR    1 This sugar mill very often makes false promises 
 regarding the prices of sugarcane it will finally pay  to its seller. 
BUYOPPORT 2 This sugar mill always refuses to offer extension services of 
supervisors to improve our farms output. 
BUYOPPORT 3 This sugar mill always try to force the prices as low as possible.  
BUYOPPORT 4 This sugar mill very often makes false accusations regarding the 
quality of sugarcanes in order to benefit on low buying prices. 
BUYOPPORT 5 Very often this sugar mill uses false weighing scales in order to 
cheat our farm of the actual tonnage supposed to be paid for. 
BUYOPPORT 6 This sugarmill always uses unforeseen events toextract extra 
payment   from our farm. 
 
6.4.2 The Independent Variable 
 
• Supplier Specific Investment 
 
This latent construct measures any investment that the suppliers may have made it (time 
and/or money specifically) to accommodate these sugar mills transactions. These 
investments would be lost if the sugar mill stopped purchasing from their farm. Therefore, 
this construct was measured by using a 7-point likert scale from 1 = 'strongly disagree' to 7 
= 'strongly agree'. Moreover, this construct has made up of 7 items which are selected from 
previous research work by Buvik and Haugland (2005); Rokkan et al., (2003); Heide and John 
(1990, 1992), Masten, Meehan, and Snyder (1991), and Walker and Poppo (1991). The items 
are presented in table 2. 
 
 
Table 2:Questionnaire items for Supplier Specific Investment 
SSPI 1 We have invested a lot of time and resources in the construction of  storage 
facility for the sugarcane enroute to this sugar mill. 
61 
 
SSPI 2 Our  farm has heavily invested in special machinery for the harvesting of the 
sugarcane for this sugar mill. 
SSPI 3 We have strongly adopted our farm to accommodate specific types of 
sugarcane variety (breed) needed by only this sugar mill.  
SSPI 4 Our farm has heavily invested in a quality assurance program require by this 
sugar mill to ensure that we meet the sugar mill required sugarcane quality 
standards.                              
SSPI 5 Our farm has made significant investement in irrigation facilities that are 
spacific for the transactions with this sugar mill.  
SSPI 6 If this sugar mill stops buying from our farm we would lose a significant part 
of our investment that we have made for dapting to  this sugar mill. 
SSPI 7 Our farm has invested significant amounts of money and time in skilful 
training of workers to adhere to the production standerds of the sugar 
mill.                    . 
   
• Environmental Uncertainty 
The scale of the environmental uncertainty variable is constructed from previous research 
work by Buvik and Haugland (2005); Rokkan et al., (2003); Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt 
(1986); Heide and John (1990); it is measured by five items where value 1 = 'strongly 
disagrees' to 7 = 'strongly agree'. the items are formulated as presented in table 3. 
 
Table 3:Questionnaire items for Environmental Uncertainty 
ENVIROUNCERT 1 It is very difficult for us to predict the demand for sugarcane 
from our farm. 
ENVIROUNCERT 2 The price of the sugarcane paid by this sugarmill is rapidly 
changing. 
ENVIRO UNCERT 3 Often It is very difficult for us to predict the levels of sugarcan 
production that will be provided by other sugarcane farms. 
ENVIRO UNCERT 4 It is very difficult for us to predict the price that this sugarmill 
will pay. 
ENVIRO UNCERT 5 A lot of uncertaintities are involved with regard to availability 
of tools  needed in our production activities (fretilizers, purge 






• Relation Duration  
According to Palmatier et al. (2006, p.140), relationship duration is defined as “the length 
of time that the relationship between the exchange partners has existed”. In another word, 
relationship duration in this study is presenting the number of years that the sugarcane 
growers(supplier) have been working with a particular sugar mill. Thus, this construct has 
been adopted from Buvik and Halskau (2001) and Buvik and Haugland (2005) and was 
operationalized by computing the natural logarithm of the actual duration between the sugar 
mill and sugarcane growers in years. However, this construct is measured using a single 
open question:  
How long have you been having trade relations with this sugar miller?                   Years 
  
• Annual Sales Volume 
In this study, supplier sales volume is defined as a control variable to capture the possible 
effect of supplier sales volume on the buyer opportunism. This construct has been adapted 
from previous research work by Heide and Miner (1992) and Sheng et al. (2010) and was 
operationalized as a single item scale. Moreover, this construct was measured as a natural 
logarithm of the total annual sales value earned by a particular sugar cane grower in selling 
sugarcane crop to its most important buyer (sugar mill). The construct is measured by a 
single open question: 
 
What is your approximate annual sales L.E last year(2016) to this sugarmill? 
 
• Annual Workforce (Size of Supplier)  
 This construct has been adapted based on Homburg and Stock (2004) and Hult, Ketchen, 
and Slater (2005), which is using the number of the workforce as a measure of the supplier 
size. In addition, the supplier size was measured by computing the natural logarithm of the 
actual number of employees working in the supplier farm. As this construct measured by 
using a single open-ended question:  
 
What is your approximate annual workforce in your farm?..................... 
6.5 Summary 
In this chapter, a general overview of each construct has been presented and defined. The 
underlying items of each dependent and independent variables have been discussed and 
evaluated. Moreover, both of measurement theory and measurement model were elaborated. 





























CHAPTER 7 - MEASUREMENTS ASSESSMENT AND DATA 
VALIDATION 
7.1 Introduction 
For assuring the quality of data and further analysis, data examination is a required 
procedure. In this chapter, the preliminary assessment of data quality is presented to assess 
the validity and reliability of the measurements used for the constructs under study, as well 
as the assessment of the hypnotized measurement model. Furthermore, the chapter shows 
data screening and cleaning under the study followed by descriptive statistics, testing data 
for outliers, missing data and skewness, kurtosis for checking normality.   
 
7.2 Data Screening and Cleaning 
  
7.2.1 Assessment of Missing Data 
Missing data is a grave issue that is a main concern in quantitative data analysis and has the 
potential to negatively impact the results of the study (Graham 2009, Malhotra and Perks 
2006; Hair et al. 2010). Consequently, it is important to verify the availability of the missing 
data and then address them appropriately. In the light of this, there are several ways to deal 
with missing data, including removing cases listwise, pairwise deletion, estimating missing 
values using earlier experiments, and using the calculated mean value of available data (Hair 
et al. 2010; Mertler and Vanata 2005). 
 
 As Meyers et al (2006), pointed out that the advantage of using list wise deletion is that this 
instrument can be used in a variety of multivariate techniques and there are no accounts are 
required. However, listwise is used to refer only to a subset of situations that present a 
complete set of results (Pallant, 2007). Nevertheless, Myers et al. (2006) claim that this 
approach restricts the size of the sample, which may increase the measurement error, and in 
accordance with Hair et al. (2010), statistical strength may be less. In contrast, pairwise 
deletion method is maximizing the use of valid data leading to a larger sample size (Hair et 
al., 2010). However, the sample size will vary for every imputation and can produce a value 
outside of the range of the correlation and Eigenvalues. Meyers et al., (2006) recommended 
not using pairwise deletion when conducting multiple regression, structure equation 




Nevertheless, in this empirical study in the 120 questionnaires which has been collected, 
there was no missing data. This is due to the data collection method that has been 
implemented in the first place, which runs the questionnaire in person, in an individual 
interview mode. This has enabled the researcher to ensure that all questions are filled out 
before splitting up with participants. 
 
7.2.2 Assessment of Outliers 
According to Byrne (2010), outliers denote a data object that deviates significantly from the 
normal objects as if it were generated by a different mechanism. In another word, an outlying 
observation, or extreme value, is one that appears to deviate markedly from other members 
of the sample in which it occurs (Pallant, 2011, Hair et al., 2010). 
 
 As Kline (2011) and Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) point out, there are two forms of 
observation in any case study either a univariate or multivariate outlier; therefore, the case 
of univariate outlier has large scores on a single variable, while in the case of a multivariate 
outlier, it has extreme scores on two or more variables. 
 
 Nevertheless, as there is no an unanimity on the definition of extreme observation, 
accordingly, the rule of thumb is defined it as observation any scores more than three 
standard deviations from the mean is an outlier (Kline, 2016). Thus, extreme values or outlier 
can deform the result, leading to biased estimators and affecting the importance of statistical 
tests (Yuan and Bentler; 2001). In addition, if the outliers are non-randomly distributed, they 
can reduce normality; therefore, in multivariate analysis, they contravene the presumption 
of specificity and multivariate normality, affecting the possibility of both Type 1 and Type 
2 error. Thus, they can affect some variables of interest in a study (seo 2006). Therefore, in 
a large sample size, cut-off points of 4.0 or greater in absolute value to identify the outliers 
is the most accurate method. However, as Kline., (2011) posits, the extreme values can be 
detected by using z scores, while cases are considered outliers with an absolute z-scores 
greater than 3. 
 
In this study data cleaning and screening have been done due to the light of suggestions by 
Kline (2011). In this study, the potential extreme values were examined based on the Hair 
et al (2010) recommendations and the observations above the cut-off point 4.0 were 
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classified as extreme values. Standard scores in the SPSS were calculated for all items and 
resulted in a maximum value of 3.24. This indicates that all observation falls under the 
cutting point that depicts the absence of an outlier problem. In addition, the value of actual 
items, such as the number of workforces ranged from eight to three thousand employees, the 
duration of the relationship ranged from one to eighty years, and sales volume ranged from 
45 to 4900 tons, which was mathematically converted to the natural logarithm to ensure 
normality. See Appendix 5. 
 
7.2.3 Skewness and Kurtosis for Normality Check 
Checking the normality of data is a hypothesis that is required to be filled in the most 
inferential statistical analysis (Kline,2016). 
 
 Normal is defined by Pallant., (2007) as, " the symmetrical bell-shaped curve which has the 
greatest frequency of scores in the middle and smaller frequencies towards the extremes". 
Thus, for assessing the normality of the distribution in this study obtaining skewness and 
kurtosis are the most commonly used statistical tools (Hair et al., 2006; Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2007). Therefore, kurtosis indicates to the degree to which the observations of a given 
distribution are converged around the central mean of a given standard deviation. As positive 
kurtosis values refer to that the distribution is concentrated around the center with long thin 
tails, while the negative kurtosis values portray that the distribution is very flat (Pallant 
2007). On the other hand, skewness is a measure of the degree of symmetry of distribution 
(Pallant 2007). Whereas a positive skewness refers that the distribution has shifted to the 
left, while a negative skewness reflects the shift to the right.  
 
A normal distributed observation has a zero value for both skewness and kurtosis. Therefore, 
in this study all the observations for skewness fall within the acceptable range that is within 
+3 to -3 and kurtosis values in the range of +1 to -1 (Kline, 2011). The SPSS output of 
skewness and kurtosis values are shown in Appendix 2.  
 
7.3 Descriptive Statistics for Variables Under Study 
According to Pallant (2011), descriptive statistics are used to represent the basic 
characteristics of the data in a study. They provide simple summaries about the sample and 
the measures. simultaneously with simple graphics analysis, they form the basis of virtually 
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every quantitative analysis of data. Thus, descriptive statistics consisted of two categories, 
which are the numerical methods encompass measures of variability such as variance, 
standard deviation and range; and measures of skewness and kurtosis; measures of central 
tendency such as mean, median, and mode and normality (Gaur and Gaur; 2009; Tabachnick 
and Fidell, 2007).  
 
In this study, the author used IBM SPSS 20 to describe a measure of variability; standard 
deviation of constructs and the measure of central tendency; mean and median: Relation 
duration, Sales volume, Workforce, Buyer opportunism, SSPI and Environmental 
uncertainty. Therefore, both of table 4 and 5 are presented the descriptive statistics of 
measurement constructs under this study. 
 
Table 4:Descriptive Statistics of Sample Characteristics 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
DURAT 120 .69 4.38 3.2891 .70240 
SALESVOL 120 3.22 8.51 5.7304 1.17496 
WORKFORCE 120 2.08 8.01 5.0221 1.31771 
      
 
 













Source: SPSS Output 
 
7.4 Scale Reliability 
According to Hair et al (2010), reliability is defined as “an assessment of the degree of 
consistency between multiple measurements of a variable”. It is “the ratio between the true 
score variance to observed score variance” (Hattie, 1985, p.139). However, and according 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Buyer Opport 120 1.33 6.83 4.4403 1.31265 
SSPI 120 -2.52 2.82 .0000 1.05130 
UNCERT 120 -3.81 1.69 .0000 1.03991 
DURAT 120 .69 4.38 3.2891 .70240 
SALESVOL 120 3.22 8.51 5.7304 1.17496 
WORKFORCE 120 2.08 8.01 5.0221 1.31771 
SSPI X UNCERT 120 -1.70 6.45 .3993 1.37952 
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to (Mentzer and Flint, 1997) assessment of reliability is an indispensable but not adequate 
term for construct validity. 
Furthermore, there are various forms used for measuring reliability, (1) Test-retest: which 
the reliability coefficient obtained with a repetition of the same measure on a second 
occasion. thus, the higher the coefficient is, the better the test-retest reliability, and 
consequently, the stability across the time (Dunn, Seaker and Waller 1994; Churchill 1979). 
(2)  Alternative forms method that one measures a variable with two various measurement 
tools at two different points in time. (O’Leary-Kelly and Vokurka,1998). (3) Internal 
consistency of estimates which is indicative of the homogeneity of the items in the measure 
that tap the construct (Kline, 2011; Creswell, 2009). It consisted of: (a) Inter-term 
Consistency Reliability: this is a test of the consistency of respondent’s answers to all the 
items in a measure. The most popular test of inter-term consistency reliability is the 
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha and composite radiality (Peterson and Kim 2013). (b) Split- 
Half Reliability: reflects the correlations between two halves of an instrument.  
 
In this study, both of Cronbach’s coefficient alpha and composite radiality are used to 
estimate the reliability of scales. In a light of that, Litwin (2003), defined Cronbach alpha as 
“It is an indication of how well the different items complement each other in their 
measurement of different aspects of the same variable or quality”. So, Its value ranges 
between zero to one. Thus, the values which are closer to one indicates to a higher internal 
consistency; the opposite for the values that closer to zero that one indicates a lower internal 
consistency (Zhong et al. 2017).  
On the other hand, 1composite reliability is used to derive a composite reliability index by 
using confirmatory factor analysis. Where composite reliability index falls between 0 to 1, 
thus the values which are closer to one indicates to a higher internal consistency; the opposite 
for the values that closer to zero that one indicates a lower internal consistency and expose 
that all the measures consistently perform the same construct (Hair et al., 2010).  
As depicts below in (Table 6), that Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for most of the constructs 
is above 0.7. For BUYOPPOR α =0.941, ENVIROUNCERT α =0.862. Although, the 
construct SSPI is α =0.697 which slightly below .70. However, Cronbach’s alpha coefficient 
                                                 
1 Composite Reliability (CR) =SSI/(SSI+SSV); whereby SSI= square of the sum of all factor loadings of a 
construct, SEV = sum of all error variances of a construct, and error variance is equal to one minus squared 




is still within the recommended threshold of reliability as long as it is greater than or equal 
to 0.5, and reliability within 0.5 thresholds is quite common and acceptable in existing 
literature. On the other hand, most of the result of CR also exceeds 0.70 for all constructs 
which imply that good construct reliability. Although, the construct SSPI is α =0.691 which 
slightly below the minimum acceptable threshold criterion, it can be approximated to 0.70, 
which is the acceptable threshold criterion (Ab Hamid et al. 2011, Hair et al. 2010, Rencher 
2003). From this, it can be said that the data collection method for this study has strong 
reliability and internal consistency.  
Table 6:Construct Reliability Scores 
7.5 Validity 
Data validity is, according to Moskal, Leydens, and Pavelich, (2002); Kimberlin, and 
Winterstein,(2008), the degree to which the evidence that supports the interpretations of data 
is correct and that interpretations are used in an appropriate manner. Therefore, to pursue 
data validity, a researcher must reduce the uncertainty associated with his\her findings 
(Brinberg and McGrath, 1983). Considering that, there are four major’s forms of data 
validity suggested by Cook and Campbell. (1979) and Hair et al. (2010): 
 
• Construct validity: testifies to how well the results obtained from the use of the 
measure fit the theories around which the test is designed. This is assessed through 
discriminant and convergent validity (Clark and Watson, 1995). 
 
• Discriminant validity: is established when, based on theory, two variables are predicted 
by measuring them are indeed empirically found to be so (Churchill,1979; Hair et al., 
2010).  
 

















SSPI   
 

















Source: SPSS Output 
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• Face validity: indicates to the extent to which the content of observed variables is 
concrete with the definition of the latent construct based on researcher’s own judgment 
(Hair et al., 2010). 
• Convergent validity: According to is established when the scores obtained with two 
different instruments measuring the same concept are highly correlated.  
 
7.5.1 Construct Validity 
 According to John and Reve, (1982) the construct validity is defined as “the extent to which 
an operationalization of a construct actually measures what it purports to measure”. As 
pointed out early, construct validity is assessed by both convergent and discriminant validity 
which are robust in capturing the domain of construct validity (Shuttlesworth,2009; Dunn, 
Seaker and Waller, 1994). In the light of that, all items that are used in this study were adopted 
from previous studies; knowing that those items were adjusted to suitable the context of the 
research problem. However, every construct in the questionnaire was developed by 
integrating inputs from practitioners and experienced researchers in the Egyptian's sugar 
industry to meet the requirement for establishing content validity (Hawkins, Pohlen, and 
Prybutok, 2013; Thatcher 2010). 
 
7.5.2 Discriminant validity 
According to Churchill (1979) and Buvik and Haugland, (2005), to prove the discriminant 
and convergent validity in this study, the author conducted EFA with varimax rotation on 
all the perceptual measures. Furthermore, Fornell and Larcker (1981) suggests that neither 
item estimate of reliability nor a composite measure indicate the amount of variance that is 
captured by the construct in relation to the amount of variance due to measurement error, 
thus (Zait and Bertea,2011) recommends the use of average variance expected (AVE) to 
examine discriminant validity which act as a means of acquiring the variance information.  
The basic assumption of discriminant validity is that items correlate higher among them than 
they correlate with other items from other constructs (Buvik and Haugland, 2005; Zait and 
Bertea,2011), thus for this study the author has employed average variance expected (AVE) 
and cross-loading estimates methods to support this assumption which is consistent to 




Findings from the exploratory factor analysis (EFA) shown in (Appendix 3) provide 
evidence for discriminant validity by examining the cross-loading values which was below 
0.5 thresholds as suggested by (Hair et al. 2010). Items were loading strongly among the 
same construct compared to another construct with loading estimate (see in Appendix 3) 
above 0.6 thresholds as recommended by (Segars,1997) to support evidence of discriminant 
validity. Similarly, the AVE values computed from the results of confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) of this study (see Appendix 4), is providing evidence of discriminant validity 
(Segars 1997; Churchill 1979), by comparing the squared value of AVE with bivariate 
correlation (see table 7) whereby all values of squared 2AVE were found to be greater than 
bivariate correlations suggesting that discriminant validity is supported (Segars 1997; Zait 
and Bertea 2011). 
 
Table 7: Construct Correlation, Descriptive statistics, Discriminant validity and Average Variance Extracted 
Constructs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. OPPORT 1.0 .468 .507 -.451 -.675 -.533 .533 
2. SSPI  1.0 .368 -.213 -.174 .006 .817 
3. ENVIUNCERT   1.0 -.076 -.451 -.252 .680 
4. DURAT    1.0 .455 .373 -.190 
5. SALVOL     1.0 .865 -.290 
6. WF      1.0 -.074 
7. INTER SSPI*UNCERT       1.0 
• AVE - .416 .695 - - - - 
• Mean 4.44 .00 .00 3.28 5.73 5.02 18.20 
• Std. Deviation 1.31 1.05 1.04 .702 1.17 1.31 6.922 
• Tolerance  .175 .107 .730 .167 .214 .1 22 
• VIF  8.47 9.35 1.369 5.97 4.66 5.88 
(source SPSS Output) 
 
 
7.5.3 Convergent Validity 
 In this study, convergent validity has been conducted to estimate the extent to which the 
multiple indicators used to measure a construct correlate with each other. The initial EFA 
results as depicted in (table 7) above and Appendix 3 showed the existence of convergent 
validity, in addition the Eigenvalue for each construct is exceeded the criterion threshold of 
                                                 
2AVE = (Sum of squared standardized loadings) / [(Sum of squared standardized loadings) + (Sum of 
indicator measurement error)].  
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1.0 which was ranges between 1.487 and 2.743 (Chen and Bulrag, 2004; Hair et al., 2010; 
Chen, Wang, and Chen 2012). in addition, the output of CFA as depicted in (table 8) below 
is showing the significant of t-value >0.05. On the other hand, composite reliability (CR)for 
BUYOPPOR, SSPI and ENVIROUNCERT are well over 0.60 recommended criterion 
threshold (Yen and Hung, 2013; Bagozzi and Yi, 1988) each 0.944, 0.691 and 0.898 respectively. 
It follows that the convergent validity is supported. 
 
Table 8: Measurement Model Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) Results (n=120) 
Construct                                               Factor Loading                                      Seven-point Likert- Scale type- items with end points                                    
                                                                     (t-value)
 b




OPPORT: 4 items 
X2 (2) = 3.31, p = 0.19 
CFI = 0.96; IFI = 0.97  
RMSEA = 0.07  



















OPPORT1: This sugar mill very often makes false promises 
 regarding the prices of sugarcane it will finally pay to its seller.   
 
OPPORT2: This sugar mill always refuses to offer extension services of 
supervisors to improve our farms output. 
  
OPPORT3: this sugar mill always tries to force the prices as low as 
possible. 
 
OPPORT4: this sugar mill very often makes false accusations regarding 
the quality of the sugarcane in order to benefits in low buying prices.    
 
OPPORT5: very often this sugar mill uses false weighing scales in order 
to cheat our farm of the actual tonnage supposed to be paid for. 
OPPORT6: this sugar mill always uses unforeseen events to extract extra 
payment from our farm.  
 
 
Supplier specific investment 
SSPI: 3 items 
CFI = 1.00; IFI = 1.00  
RMSEA = 0.05  
α = 0.64; CR = 0.691  










SSPI1: We have invested a lot of time and resources in the construction 
of storage facility for the sugarcane enroute to this sugar mill. 
 
SSPI4: Our farm has heavily invested in a quality assurance program 
require by this sugar mill to ensure that we meet the sugar mill required 
sugarcane quality standards.  
 
SSPI7: Our farm has invested significant amounts of money and time in 
skillful training of workers to adhere to the production standards of the 




X2 (2) = 3.31, p = 0.19 
CFI = 0.96; IFI = 0.97  
RMSEA = 0.06  














ENVIROUNCERT1: It is very difficult for us to predict the demand for 
sugarcane from our farm. 
 
ENVIROUNCERT3: often it is very difficult for us to predict the levels 
of sugarcane production that will be provided by other sugarcane farms. 
 
ENVIROUNCERT4: it is very difficult for us to predict the price that 
this sugar mill will pay. 
 
ENVIROUNCERT5: a lot of uncertainties are involved with regard to 
availability of tools needed in our production activities.  
aFixed variable. 
bStandardized loadings significant at p < 0.05 





7.6 Assessment of the Hypothesized Measurement Model 
 
A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) uses several appropriate indicators in this study to 
review the fit of the predictable measurement model (Hair et al. 2010; Kline,2011) and 
examination of unidimensional that provides proof of items of a scale approximation one 
factor (Dunn, Seaker and Waller,1994). The outcomes found out from SPSS and Amos 22 
(see table 8), show acceptable fit of our model to the data. In accordance with previous 
studies (Zahoor et al. 2017; Xiong, Skitmore and Xia 2015) four mostly goodness-of-fit 
indicators were utilized to review the measurement model suitable in this study together with 
Chi-square (X2), accustomed Ch-square(X2/df): Chi-square to degree of freedom ratio, 
RSMEA; root-mean-square fault of approximation, comparative fit index (CFI) and 
Incremental fit index (IFI). The results from CFA depicted in (table 8 and Appendix 4), 
shows that, IFI=0.97, CFI=0.96 were above 0.9 threshold for satisfactory model fit (Xiong, 
Skitmore and Xia,2015), at the same time as the value of RMSEA=0.07 was in the range of 
0.05 to 0.08 threshold of reasonable model fit therefore the measurement model fitted the 
data (Sydorenko, 2012; Kline 2011). 
 
Additionally, the Chi-square (X2) and adjusted/normalized Chi-squared was used to review 
the overall of the model fit by analyzing the inconsistency between the sample (Xiong 
Skitmore and Xia 2015). The outcome shown in Appendix 2(a), discovered that Chi-square 
goodness fit of overall model was momentous (X2=283.917, df =21, p=0.000) which 
indicates insufficiently good fit (Kline,2011), however Chi-square has been criticized for 
being sensitive to sample size which tends to refuse the model when sample size increases 
(Hair et al.,2010; Kline, 2011; Bryne, 2010), therefore adjusted Chi-square was used to assess 
the overall model fit which takes the impact of sample size.  The value for adjusted Chi-
square (X2/df) were 283.917which is in the range of 3.1 or 2.1 of recommended overall 
model fit (Kline 2011; Hair et al. 2010; Zahoor et al. 2017). Furthermore, every item of scale 




This chapter has inspected the reliability and justification of the measurement model. It 
assessed missing data, outliers and normality. Besides, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) 
74 
 
followed by factor analysis that was performed (CFA) to assess the measurement model. 















































































CHAPTER EIGHT - HYPOTHESES TESTS AND EMPIRICAL 
FINDINGS 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter expands the discussions in the earlier chapter by further analyzing the data. The 
chapter presents the results of hierarchical regression analysis. It also provides the 
hypothesis test that was developed early in Chapter Four.  Interaction term are clearly 
defined. Nevertheless, the chapter shows experimental test results for hypotheses. 
8.2 Regression Model 
According to Lipovetsky (2013) and Lavine (2005), regression modeling is widely used for 
statistical analysis and prediction in many applied research problems. The ordinary multiple 
linear least squares (OLS) regression is the foremost of regression modeling which results 
in the best quality of data fit estimated by the minimum residual square error achieved by 
the aggregate of the predictors (Gujarati, 2003; Buvik and Andersen 2015). In different 
studies, ordinary least square regression model has been used to estimate the effect of 
independent on the dependent variables (Buvik and Halskau 2006, Buvik et al., 2014; 
Salama., 2014). Therefore, the author employed ordinary Least Squares (OLS) for the model 
of estimating the variables in determining the main effect of environmental uncertainty and 
relationship duration on buyer’s opportunism to examine the hypothesis used in this study. 
Also, the interaction effect of environmental uncertainty and supplier assets specificity were 
part of the model in determining their role on buyer’s opportunism. The supplier sales 
volume and worke force were used as a control variable. Therefore, the regression model is 
presented as follows: 
BUYER OPPORT= b0 + b1UNCERT + b2SSPI + b3DURAT + b4 $ SALVOL + b5WF+ b6UNCERT*SSPI+ 




BUYER OPPORT =  Buyer Opportunism 
Independent variables: 
UNCERT              =          Environmental Uncertainty  
SSPI   = Supplier Specific Investments 
DURAT   =  Relation Duration 
UNCERT*SSPI     = Environmental Uncertainty * Supplier Specific Investments   
Control Variable: 
SALVOL  =  Sales Volume 
WF   =  Workforce 
 
𝜀 = Error term 




8.3 Estimation Results 
8.3.1 Correlation Matrix 
The challenge faced by this study in the initial phase was the interaction effect among 
variables that carriage a risk of multicollinearity. Since the purpose of the regression model 
is to measure dependency and non-interdependence of variables, this is indication of weak 
empirical design that poses a threat to precisely measure and determine the relationship 
regression analysis pursues to establish (Farrar & Glauber, 1967; Hair et al.,2010 and Buvik 
et al, 2014; Pallant,2011). In this circumstance, the hypothesis that the explanatory variables 
must be independent of each other is violated.  
 
The main challenge in regression analysis arises when one of the predictors appears to be 
related to another, which looks to be redundant. This occurs when two or more explanatory 
variables overlap in a sample (Hair et al., 2010; Willis and Berlak 1978, Rencher 2002). This 
problem is alarming in regression analysis because it results in an error estimation of the 
regression coefficient; it affects the R square, resulted in a large variance in estimates and 
thus to poor quality for outcome parameter estimates. In some circumstances, it also leads 
to a poor identification of the model, resulting in a less-valued biased square. It makes the 
estimates for a given data set very delicate, consequently changing the estimated coefficient. 
The separation of the effect of explanatory variables and the inability to explain variance in 
the dependent variable is a problem (Willis and Berlak 1978).  
 
 The author uses the factor of tolerance and variance inflation factor, to solve this problem 
and avoid its negative impact on estimates (Hair et al.,2010; Pallant, 2011; Kline,2011; Voss 
2004). Using the tolerance method to moderate the multicollinearity effect, the Pearson 
coefficient is settled with independent variables and deducted from one (1-R square). The 
higher the value, the lower the degree of risk of multicollinearity. Hence, the threshold 
criterion for admissibility is a value equal to or greater than 0.1 (Hair et al.,2010; Pallant, 
2011; Kline ,2011). On the other hand, Kline, 2011 and Pallant, 2011 argue that variance 
inflation factor values should not be greater than or equal 10. 
 
 The author adopted the mean centering of the independent variables used in the interaction 
effect, as a resolution to a multicollinearity problem. This was done to increase the accuracy 
of the estimation of the regression coefficient as used in many of the existing literature 
(Robinson and Schumaker, 2009; Jaccard, Wan and Turrisi 1990, Rokkan, Heide and Wathne 
78 
 
2003, Buvik, Andersen and Gronhaug 2014). Adopting the mean centering of the independent 
variable and the moderator variable ensures the moderation of the independent variable’s 
effect on the dependent variable at the given moderator variable exhibitions its mean. Thus, 
the interaction effect is not negatively affected (Rencher 2002; Rokkan et al, 2003). 
Furthermore, this study revealed a heteroscedasticity but found no evidence of it. 
 
Table 9, below depicts bivariate correlation matrix and descriptive statistics of the constructs 
of this study. The results show that Environmental uncertainty(ENVIUNCERT), Supplier 
specific investment(SSPI), Relationship Duration(DURAT), Supplier Sales volume 
(SALVOL) and Workforce (WF) and the interaction effects, are significantly related to 
Buyer Opportunism (BUYEROPPORT).  
 
Furthermore, as it shows in the correlation matrix below there is no value greater than or 
equal 0.9 as recommended by Pallant.,2011. Likewise, by looking to both factor of tolerance 
and variance inflation factor, for tolerance factor there is no value is less than or equal 0.1, 
in addition to variance inflation factor, shows that there no is value greater than 10 
(Pallant.,2011; Kline., 2011). From this analysis, the author found that multi collinearity is 
not a problem in this research model and the variables are not highly corelated. 
 
Table 9: Correlation Matrix, Descriptive Statistics and Collinearity Diagnostics 
constructs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. OPPORT 1.0 .468 .507 -.451 -.675 -.533 .533 
2. SSPI  1.0 .368 -.213 -.174 .006 .817 
3. ENVIUNCERT   1.0 -.076 -.451 -.252 .680 
4. DURATb    1.0 .455 .373 -.190 
5. SALVOLb     1.0 .865 -.290 
6. WFb      1.0 -.074 
7. INTER SSPI*UNCERT       1.0 
• Mean 4.44 .00 .00 3.28 5.73 5.02 18.20 
• Std. Deviation 1.31 1.05 1.04 .702 1.17 1.31 6.922 
• Tolerance  .175  .107 .730 .167 .214 .122 
• VIF  8.47 9.35 1.369 5.97 4.66 5.88 
aMean-centred variables 
bTransformed variables into natural logarithm 
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8.3.2 Regression Analysis 
 In accordance with Montgomery, Pick and Winning 2012, regression analysis is one of the 
most widely used methods of multivariate data analysis in various fields of research.  
Furthermore, Tabachnik and Fidel 2007; Pallant., 2011, were defined regression analysis as 
“a set of statistical techniques that allow one to evaluate the relationship between a single 
dependent variable and numerous independent variables for a given range of data”. 
 
 the results of the hierarchical multiple regression analysis which has been used in the 
analysis are depicted in (Table 10 and 11) below for two models. The formulation for model 
1 was as follows (i) Dependent variable: Buyer’s opportunism(BUYEROPPORT); (ii) 
Independent variables: Environmental Uncertainty (ENVIUNCERT), Supplier Specific 
Investment (SSPI), Relation Duration (DURAT) (iii) Control variables:  Supplier Sales 
Volume(SALVOL) and Supplier workforce (WF). Moreover, for model 2 the formulation 
was included all the main constructs plus the Interaction term: Environmental Uncertainty 
(ENVIUNCERT) and Supplier Specific Investment (SSPI). Thus, we can be able to compare 
the estimates and the strength of the two models by using both the difference in 𝑅2 and F-
change statistic.  
   
As depicted in (table 10 and 11) below results from the hierarchical multiple regression 
analysis   is signposted fit of model 1 and model 2. An overall assessment of Model 1(see 
Appendix 5b) was found to be statistically significant at p<.05, (t =8.12, p<.05, R2 = 0.632, 
R2Adj = 0.612, F (6,92) =29.234. In the light of that, the interpretation of the Value of R
2
Adj 
= 0.612, which means that 61% of the variance of buyer’s opportunism can be explained by 
a model whereby 39% can be explained by other factors not encompassed in this study hence 
not counted in the model. Thus, Field (2009) claimed that R2 shows how much variance is 
explained by the model compared to how much variance there is to explain in the first place. 
It is the proportion of variance in the outcome variable that is shared by the predictor 
variable. Moreover, Faraway 2002, has defined the square of the correlation coefficient as 
for the proportion of the variance that has been explained using the explanatory variable.  
  
Similarly, an overall assessment of the model 2 (see Appendix 5b) which has interaction 
effects portrays that, the model is statically significant at p<.05, (t =8.99, p<.05, R2 = 0.666, 
R2Adj = 0.633, F (7,4 3) =30.284. In model 2, the Value of R
2
Adj = 0.633, which means that 
63.3% of the variance of buyer’s opportunism can be explained by a model whereby 36.7% 
can be explained by other factors not involved in this study hence not counted in the model. 
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By comparing the two models it can be noticed that R2Adj has increased due to the existence 
of interaction effects in this model; i.e. Environmental uncertainty*Supplier specific 
investment. The increment in the change in R2 by introducing the interaction effect was 
0.021. 
Table 10:Hierarchical Regression Analysis: Dependent Variable-Buyer Opportunism (BUYEROPPORT) 
 
aSignificant at p < 0.01 for t-values greater than 2.33 one tail  
bSignificant at p < 0.05 for t-values greater than 1.65 one tail  












B Std. Error Beta 
 
Constant (b0) 11.038 1.359 
 
8.121 .000 
MEANSSPI (b1) 1.156 .380 .925 3.038 .003 
MEANUNCERT (b2) .662 .220 .524 3.003 .003 
LOGTIME (b3) -.322 .125 -.173 -2.582 .011 
LOGSALES (b4) -.385 .156 -.345 -2.470 .015 
LOGWORKFORCE (b5) -.104 .123 -.104 -.843 .401 
 Model 1 Fit:                  R2 =0.632, R2Adj =0.612, F (6,92) =29.234, p=0.000, n=120 
 
 
Table 11:Hierarchical Regression Analysis with interaction effect 





B Std. Error Beta 
 
Constant (b0) 11.055 1.459 
 
8.99 a .000 
MEANSSPI (b1) 1.149 .390 .975 3.038 a .003 
MEANUNCERT (b2) H1(+) .654 .260 .554 3.003 a .003 
LOGTIME (b3)           H3(-) -.300 .165 -.153 -2.582a .011 
LOGSALES (b4) -.375 .166 -.335 -2.470a .015 
LOGWORKFORCE (b5) -.104 .153 -.104 -.843d .401 
Intraspixuncert (b6)     H2(-) -.154 .063 -.713 -2.103b .038 
 Model 2 Fit:                  R2 =0.666, R2Adj =0.633, F (7,43) =30.284, p=0.000, n=120 
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8.4 Test of Hypotheses 
 
The author reformulates the regression equation as follows by substituting the figures in 
Table 11 above:  
 
OPPORT=11.055+0.654UNCERT+1.149SSPI−0.300DURAT−0.375$SALVOL0−0.104WF−0.154 
SSPI x UNCERT +ε …Equation (8.2)  
 
The relationship between dependent variable buyer opportunism (OPPORT) and (i) 
independent variables: supplier specific investment(SSPI), environmental uncertainty 
(ENVIUNCERT), relationship duration (DURAT). (ii) control variable: annual sales 
volume ($SALVOL) (iii) one interaction term: environmental uncertainty (ENVIUNCERT) 
and supplier specific investment(SSPI) (ENVIUNCERT x SSPI) is demonstrated by the 
regression model in Equation 8.2. 
 
 Hypothesis 1 
The effect of environmental uncertainty (ENVIUNCERT) is commensurate positively with 
buyer opportunism (OPPORT), the more the environmental uncertainty increases, the more 
the buyer acts opportunistically. as an evidence to support H1 at P < 0.05 (b2 = 0.654, t = 
3.003, p < 0.003, one tail). 
 
Hypothesis 2 
Hypotheses H2 is divided into two sub-hypotheses (H2a, H2b) related to interaction terms 
ENVIUNCERT x SSPI respectively. As for H2a, the association between environmental 
uncertainty and buyer opportunism is significantly increased when supplier specific 
investment is introduced. The output of the regression analysis in (Table 11) above indicates 
that interaction term for H2a is negative and significant, with (b6= -0.154, t = -2.103, p < 
0.038), which leads to rejecting hypothesis H2a. 
 
On the other hand, H2b stats that; the relation association between interaction term and buyer 
opportunism has a negative impact, as environmental uncertainty and buyer opportunism are 
inversely proportional to supplier-specific investment, this has verified to be statistically 
significant at p< 0.05 which gives us the strong evidence both empirically and statistically 





Hypothesis 3  
This hypothesis (H3) depicts a negative impact of the relationship duration on the buyer 
opportunism. The hypothesis expects that the sugarcane farmers who have been in a longer 
buyer-seller relationship with the sugar mills perceive the latter as being less opportunistic 
due to the accrued relational norms and shared values. this hypothesis is indicated to be 
statistically significant at p< 0.05 which gives us the strong evidence both empirically and 
statistically to support hypothesis with (b3 = -0.300, t = 2.582, p < 0.011). 
  
8.4.1 Interpretation of Interaction Effects 
According to Preacher et al., (2006), interaction effects are usually measured by testing the 
significance of the product's multiplier term between two or more variables that control the 
most relevant low-key impacts. The existence of interaction term in the regression model of 
this study increases the opportunity of multicollinearity problems by either increasing or 
decreasing the correlations between the items. Therefore, Buvik and Anderson, 2015 
suggested using of mean-centered scales of the two variables entering the interaction term 
ENVIUNCERT*SSPI to avoid the problem of multicollinearity. Thus, the author of this 
study has used mean-centered values for environmental uncertainty and supplier specific 
investment to compute the interaction term of these two variables.    
 
According to Buvik et al., (2014) and Rokkan et al., (2003), in order to evaluate the effect 
of interaction term in regression Equation 8.1 above the author took the partial derivative of 
environmental uncertainty (ENVIUNCERT) and supplier specific investment (SSPI) with 
respect to buyer opportunism (OPPORT) we considered the partial effect of the 
environmental uncertainty (ENVIUNCERT) on buyer opportunism in the existence of a 
supplier specific investment (SSPI) of buyer-seller relationship. The partial derivative is 





 =b1 – b2 SSPI …………………………………………...………………………….  Equation 8.3 
 
According to the values that shown in Equation 8.2 above, the coefficient values were 








Constructed on the result of equation 8.4 the partial derivative of environmental uncertainty with 
respect to buyer opportunism in consideration with the supplier assets specificity was plotted in 
Figure 11 below where y=
δOPPORT
δUNCERT
   and x= SSPI. 
. The Figure demonstrates that with the increasing level of supplier specific investment in their 
farms, the increasing consequence of buyer opportunism and environmental uncertainty reduce. 
This provides an empirical support for hypothesis (H2a). 
 
Figure 11Effect of Environmental Uncertainty on Buyer Opportunism at Different Levels of Supplier Assets Specificity  
 
Source: Researcher’s own drawing (2017) 
 
8.5 Effects of Control Variables 
 
This study includes two control variables in the theoretical model namely Supplier Sales 
Volume (SALESVOL) and the Size of the Supplier depicted by the suppliers’ work force 
(WORKFORCE).  
 
As depicted in (table 11) above of the hierarchical regression analysis, the assessment of 
supplier sales volume has a negative effect on buyer opportunism with b4= -.375; t= -.2470; 
p <0.01. this significant relation is reducing the buyer acting opportunistically due to the 
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importance of the supplier that considered as a strategic supplier due to its large volume of 
sales. In another word, as a supplier has a large amount of sales to the sugar mills, thus the 
sugar mills have to act less opportunistically (Guldbrandsen and Haugland 2000). On the 
other hand, the second control variable in this study supplier workforce refers to the number 
of workers employed by a sugarcane farmer or institution. The findings reveal that there is 
also a negative association between supplier workforce and buyer opportunism with 
insignificant impact on determining the level of buyer opportunism with b5= -.104; t= -.843; 
p>.40. 
 
8.6 Summary of Hypotheses Test 
 
Table 12, below presents the summary of the hypothesized effects and the findings. The 
results show that all three hypotheses were supported significantly except hypotheses H2a. 
 
Table 12:Summary of Hypotheses Test 
Hypothesis Coefficient     t-Value Findings 
H1: There is a positive association between the level of 
environmental uncertainty and opportunism in the 
sugar mills-sugarcane farmer’s relationships. 
0.662 3.003** Supported 
 
H2a: The association between environmental 
uncertainty and buyer opportunism is significantly 
increased when supplier specific investments are 
introduced.  
         - - rejected 
 
H2b: The association between environmental 
uncertainty and buyer opportunism is reduced when 
supplier specific investments are introduced. 
     -0.154 -2.103*** Supported 
 
H3: There is a negative association between longer 
relationship duration between sugarcane farmers and 
sugar mills and the buyers’ opportunism. 
  
-0.322 -2.582*** Supported 
aSignificant at p < 0.01 for t-values greater than 2.33 one tail  




In this chapter, OLS regression technique was used to derive the estimated regression model 
used in this study. Furthermore, the chapter shows the results of hierarchical regression 
analysis of the buyer's opportunistic discretion and subsequent tests of hypotheses. All 
85 
 
hypotheses (H1, H2a, H2b, H3) were strongly supported in this study. The following chapter 
provides a summary of the findings and provides an extensive discussion in the light of the 













































































This final chapter of the study concludes the discussions raised in previous chapters in 
relevance to preceding three theories of TCA, RCT and Power-Dependence. Furthermore, 
the chapter presents an overview of the analysis and results, and further incorporates the 
analysis’ in presenting the theoretical and managerial implications of the study to the extant 
literature and real world. Finally, the limitation of the study and areas for further research 
are also presented. 
9.2 Discussions and Implications  
9.2.1 Theoretical Implications 
 
The main aim of the study is to draw empirical evidence of opportunistic behavior between 
sugarcane farmers and the sugar mills in the Egyptian sugar industry in the light of 
Transaction Cost Analysis, Relational Contracting Theory and the Power-Dependence 
theory. This study focuses solely on the buyer-seller relationships as the unit of analysis in 
determining the prerequisites of opportunism persisting between the Kom Ombo sugar mill, 
which is the biggest in the country, and the sugarcane farmers. The study has brought forth 
four hypotheses to enlighten the existing opportunistic behaviors by predetermining the 
antecedents based on the mentioned preceding theories. 
 
Opportunism construct 
Opportunism has been defined as self-interest seeking with guile and ranges from lying, 
stealing, cheating and all kinds of deceit, with calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, 
obfuscate or confuse. Williamson (1985) further argues the introduction of asymmetric 
information gives room for people to act opportunistically for their own interest instead of 
the other party. The definition of opportunism includes two forms; as blatant or strong form 
opportunism and may manifest in the initiation stage of an exchange relationship through 
deliberate misrepresentations of some kind (ex-ante) or through violations over the course 
of the relationship (ex-post), (Williamson 1975;1985; Masten, 1988, Wathne and Heide, 
2000).  According to Wathne and Heide (2000), opportunism can manifest in existing or 
new conditions in the form of active or passive forms. This study therefore has asserted the 
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arguments from Wathne and Heide (2000) and Williamson (1975) from the different actions 
the sugar mill has taken in existing and new conditions taking the shape of sugarcane price 
manipulation, not offering extensive services to farmers even after putting forth promises, 




Extant literature posits that high environmental volatility enforces ex-ante problems of 
formulating comprehensive contracts that in turn result to adaptation problems (Williamson, 
1979; Rindfleisch and Heide 1997) Buvik and Grønhaug (2000) argue that the dynamics of 
economy and technology pronounce uncertainty, leading to adaptation problems that are a 
prerequisite for opportunistic behavior in exchange relationships hence the need for writing 
very complex contracts covering all future uncertainties (Williamson, 1991).  
 
The study hypothesized a positive association between the level of environmental 
uncertainty and opportunistic behavior of the Kom Ombo sugar mill, an argument that has 
been supported by the findings of the study. The findings of the study are consistent with 
the extant literature as environmental uncertainty had positive relationship with 
opportunistic behavior at b2= .654, t= 3.003, p˂ 0.003. Therefore, the study cements the 
findings in the extant literature such as works of Aldrich, (1979); Chen, (2013); Baker, 
(2015) and Lim et al (2014).   
 
The Moderating Effect of Supplier Asset Specificity on Environmental Uncertainty 
The preceding sub-chapter sheds light on the relationship between environmental 
uncertainty and opportunism. The research further goes to study the impact of introducing 
asset specificity in the presence of environmental uncertainty in hypotheses H2a and H2b. 
Specific investments facilitate transactions in exchange relationships, however they tend to 
be uniquely dedicated to specific transactions (Wathne and Heide, 2000; Buvik and Reve, 
2002).  
 
Asset specificity has led to two schools of thought. Some scholars debate that the 
idiosyncratic nature of specific investments means that they cannot be redeployed puts the 
focal receiver in a driving seat to expropriate the investments (Rokkan, Wathne and Heide, 
2003). Moreover, extant literature argues that the introduction of idiosyncratic investment 
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brings about contractual difficulties as transactions involved are prone to exchange hazards 
and high switching costs leading to opportunistic tendencies due to the expropriation effect 
that comes with the specific investment (Allen, 2015; Williamson, 1979). 
 
In fact, scholars such as Williamson (1979) incorporate asset specificity and environmental 
uncertainty, claiming that as the degree of uncertainty increases, it makes it more imperative 
that the parties devise a machinery to ‘work things out’ such as specific investments—since 
contractual gaps will be larger and the occasions for sequential adaptations will increase in 
number and importance, however exposing parties to opportunism. The second school of 
thought supports the argument of the importance of specific investments in marketing 
strategies and inter-firm relationships due to their value creation hence giving dyads 
competitive advantages (Rokkan, Heide and Wathne 2003; Ghosh and John (1999).  
 
The findings of this study on the second hypothesis of the moderation effect of specific 
investments in the presence of environmental uncertainty are in alignment with the second 
school of thought discussed above. The findings show that the introduction of asset 
specificity by the sugarcane farmers offset negatively the environmental uncertainty’s 
impact on the buyer’s opportunism at b6= -0 .154, t= -2.103, p˂ 0.038. Farmers that have 
invested heavily on investments such as machinery, specific sugarcane breeds, quality 
assurance programs are valued by the sugar mills as strategic suppliers and this leads to 
competitive advantages (Ghosh and John, 1999) over the farmers that have little or no 
specific investments in their businesses, especially the small-scale farmers. This study 
therefore contributes to the second school of thought of the negative impact of the 
moderating effect specific investments have on opportunistic behavior of sugar mills in the 
presence of environmental uncertainty. 
 
Relationship Duration 
According to Anderson, (1995) and Dwyer et al., (1987) relational contracting theory 
advocates continuous relationships between exchange parties is a vital element that fosters 
businesses’ desired outcomes. Moreover, RCT theorists further denote that relational 
dimensions become strategic tools of competitive advantage in exchange relationships 
especially under unstable, risky, and highly competitive environment (Ozkan-Tektas, 2014; 
Barry, Dion, and Johnson, 2008). Scholars such as Macneil (1980); Buvik, Andersen and 
Grønhaug, (2014); Heide and John, (1990); and Heide (1994), note that many exchange 
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relations are governed by formal contracts as form of governance mechanism to combat 
unforeseen exchange hazards and as more interactions occur between the parties, 
relationships start to nurture, and over time relational norms, trust and shared values develop 
and act as a form of governance and act as a cushion of counteracting opportunism.  
 
The findings of the study regarding relationship duration’s association with opportunism are 
in alignment with the works of many scholars at b3= -0.300, t= 2.582, p˂ 0.011. such as 
Heide and John (1990); Heide (1994) and Burki and Buvik (2010) just to name a few. This 
study therefore contributes to the extant literature by shedding light on the role relationship 
duration and the derived relational norms play in curbing opportunistic behaviors in 
exchange relationships.   
  
Supplier Sales Volume and Work Force (Firm Size) 
This study advocates supplier power in terms of the sales volume and the work force 
suppliers employ. Bigger farmers tend to have larger sales volume and a larger work force 
compared to small-scale farmers, and this translates that bigger farmers are strategic 
suppliers hence sugar mills will tend to reduce their opportunistic tendencies to keep them. 
In fact, bigger farmers tend also to employ specific assets that are needed to facilitate 
exchange relationships with the sugar mills. The subject of power-dependence can therefore 
not be ignored in such cases.  
 
Guldbrandsen and Haugland (2000) argue firm size is a crucial variable and plays important 
roles in shaping exchange relationships. Williamson (1985) also posits larger firms tend to 
easily integrate compared to small firms due to their high economies of scale. Large-scale 
farmers therefore are more likely to develop close ties with their trading partners compared 
to small-scale farmers, thus negatively impacting opportunistic behavior of the buyers. 
Large firms also possess influential power thus getting preferential treatment from their 
exchange partners compared to small ones. This influential power therefore dampens 
opportunism. 
 
The findings of the study suggest firm size and supplier workforce are negatively associated 
to opportunistic behavior at b4= - 0.375, t= -0.2470, p˂ 0.01 and b5= - 0.104, t= -0.843, p> 
0.40, respectively.  This study therefore contributes to the understanding on the role power-
dependence as vital antecedents to opportunistic behaviors in exchange relationships. More 
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power translates to less dependence therefore less opportunism, and more dependence 
translates to less power hence prone to opportunistic behaviors of powerful exchange 
partners. 
 
9.2.2 Managerial Implications 
This study brings forth the implications for the stakeholders in the sugarcane business with 
stress being put on the farmers’ side by advocating measures that can help them curb 
opportunism.  
 
According to the findings of the study, relationship duration is a vital factor in dampening 
the impact of opportunism in the exchange relationships between the Kom Ombo sugar mill 
and the sugarcane farmers. Extant literature purports relation contracting as a form of 
governance of exchange relationships through the exchange norms such as trust (Macneil, 
1978; Ozkan-Tektas 2014). Some scholars have argued that some exchange parties opt to 
opportunistic behavior in short-term relations or in early stages of the exchange relationship 
where the trust and other norms are still underdeveloped (Burki and Buvik, 2010; Ozkan-
Tektas, 2014). Based on this argument, the study therefore suggests the farmers should align 
their long-term organizational goals with those of the sugar mills to enhance the buyer-
supplier relationships through the formation of relational norms that curb opportunistic 
behavior. Furthermore, most of the transactions between sugar mills and the sugarcane 
farmers are conducted through gentlemen’s’ agreements. This leaves the sugarcane farmers 
exposed in case sugar mills decide to act opportunistically. The farmers therefore should 
review their governance structures by supplement relational contracts with formal contracts 
to further reduce expropriation from sugar mills that underrate relational contracts.  
 
According to USDA (2017) Upper Egypt’s economy is heavily dependent on sugar cane 
production. This dependency on sugarcane growing leaves the farmers susceptible to 
opportunistic behaviors by sugar mills as farmers have no alternative crops in their farms. 
In fact, sugarcane is a perennial crop, taking over two years of crop husbandry to the time 
of harvesting. The managerial implication of the study to the sugar cane growers is that they 
can diversify their crop portfolio such as sugar beets and other short-term crops that can 
sustain their business especially when facing uncertainty and price volatility for sugarcane. 
Moreover, most farmers individually sell directly to the sugar mills. According to 
Williamson (1985), suggests that unions and collective agreements reduce opportunistic 
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tendencies, acting as a source for exchange relationship efficiency. The farmers can 
therefore opt for collective bargaining mechanisms through trade unions that will facilitate 
supplier power to some extent and help farmers in case sugar mills try to extort benefits from 
farmers. 
 
9.2.3 Public Policy Implications 
The existence of buyer opportunism in the Egyptian sugar industry is imminent and cannot 
be ignored as such expropriations undermine parties who experience exchange hazards in 
exchange relationships. Wathne and Heide (2000) have illustrated the various faces 
opportunism such as breach of contracts, bait-and-switch tactics, quality shirking, 
falsification of reports and violation of promotion agreements. The Egyptian sugar industry 
depicts a power-dependence situation in a monopsony market with power inclined towards 
the sugar mills at the expense of the sugarcane growing farmers. In such a scenario, this 
study brings forth the problems facing this industry and proposes the Egyptian government 
intervention in curbing the buyers’ opportunism to stimulate growth in this industry. 
Therefore, the study proposes some measures the government of Egypt could undertake in 
resolving the situation. 
 
The Egyptian could review the contracts they offer to farmers and assert clauses that are 
balanced or favor the farmers from the environmental uncertainty, especially on the price 
volatility of the raw sugarcane and inflation of input. The government should ensure a 
reimbursement scheme is in place to compensate and support farmers especially on all 
matters arising from environmental uncertainty and stabilize the prices or stick to the prices 
as per contracts and not underpay the farmers. Moreover, the government should ensure 
transparency during offloading of famers’ tonnage to curb the practices of tonnage cheating 
by the sugar mills. This should further be enforced by ensuring transparency and fairness by 
the judicial system of the country. 
 
Moreover, the government should ensure the offering of more inputs and investments related 
to improve sugarcane growing and boost production in form of extension services, farming 
equipment and even irrigation systems that can reclaim desert lands to productive lands. 
This will enable to empower local farmers and safeguard the Egyptian sugar industry 




The Egyptian government should also ensure strict measures are put in place for the 
exporters by imposing high export taxes to discourage the exportation of sugar that leads to 
sugar deficit in the country.  To the sugar importers, the government can use mechanisms 
such as floating the Egyptian pound (currency devaluation) making it expensive to import 
large amounts of cheap sugar. 
 
This study also suggests a partial privatization of the Egyptian sugar mills to increase 
competition both in prices and quality. The introduction of private sugar mills under high 
government regulations will change the market structure from a monopsony structure to 
oligopoly and increase competition and offer better prices to farmers hence reduce 
opportunism from the powerful government-owned sugar mills and ensure fair marketing 
practices. 
9.3 Limitations of the Study and Areas of Further Research 
This sub-chapter addresses the limitations of the study that need to be addressed for future 
research. This study has focused on only three antecedents of the buyer opportunism in the 
Egyptian sugar industry. The three drivers discussed in the study include supplier asset 
specificity, environmental uncertainty and relationship duration that influence the sugar 
mills’ opportunistic behavior towards the sugarcane farmers. Although these drivers have 
some relations with the dependent variable, this study has not exhausted many factors that 
influence opportunism.  
 
This study offers a further room for research on other drivers of opportunism such as the use 
of contracts, information asymmetry, the role of collective bargaining and the frequency of 
transactions to name a few that can be derived from other theoretical frameworks necessary 
to challenge the opportunism variable. 
 
Moreover, the nature of the Egyptian sugar industry’s environment is characterized by 
volatility and dynamism in terms of climate change, production output, prices of raw 
sugarcane, prices of raw materials such as fertilizers, and transportation costs of raw 
sugarcane to mills (USDA, 2016; USDA, 2017). Uncertainty is an aspect of time. However, 
the study is a cross-sectional design, which assesses the industry in a specific ‘snapshot’ 
time (Creswell, 2014). Therefore, this study gives room for a longitudinal approach which 
employ continuous or repeated measures to study particular behaviors or drivers of the 
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conceptual framework over prolonged periods of time. Longitudinal research designs have 
the prospects of studying the dynamism of the Egyptian sugar industry with respect to the 
dependent and independent variables over time. Moreover, longitudinal studies also offer 
the benefits of establishing sequence of events, excluding a recall of bias participants and 
the ability to identify and relate events to exposures in chronological orders (Caruana et al, 
2015). 
 
The Egyptian sugar industry supply chain comprises of many actors such as importers and 
exporters of sugar, agents, the by-product market, wholesalers, retailers and consumers. This 
study has solely focused on the producers (sugar-cane farmers) and the processing sugar 
mills. In fact, other producers (beet-root growers) have been omitted although their 
contribution to the Egyptian sugar industry is highly acknowledged. This is a room for 
further research where studies could base on determining the relationship performances of 
different actors in this supply chain.  
 
In this study, the dependent opportunism variable has been investigated from the side of the 
sellers (sugarcane producers) to determine the extent of the sugar mills exploitation towards 
farmers.  Data has been collected from the farmers’ perspectives and the results give one-
sided illustrations of dyadic relationships with the sugar mills. However, future researchers 
can consider studying the same relationship between the farmers and sugar mills at a 
different perspective: collecting data on both sides of the dyad in order to curb the problem 
of biasness and further see the opportunistic behaviors of farmers in this relationship.  
 
According to the study, the nature of the research setting is in a monopsony situation, where 
there is only one buyer and many sellers.  This is a scenario that is very rare in the real-life 
economic world, drawing the absolute power the buyer has over the sellers (van Weele, 
2009). This research also further gives room for other opportunistic studies to be done in 
other market settings such as perfect competitive markets, monopoly and oligopoly market 
structures to determine the impact market structures have on the opportunistic behavior of 
exchange partners and how those market structures can counter-act such negative business 
practices. 
Finally, the results and findings of the study are strictly confined to the Egyptian sugar 
industry. Generalizing the results in other manufacturing and service industries such is not 
feasible as the study solely focused on a single industry analysis. This study therefore has a 
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high internal validity making it difficult to explicitly draw conclusions in other industry 
settings. The study therefore proposes future opportunism studies across different industries 
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Appendix 1: Questionnaire 
Dear Respondent, 
RE: SURVEY ON  
ANTECEDENTS OF BUYER OPPORTUNISM IN THE EGYPTIAN SUGAR 
INDUSTRY: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY BETWEEN SUGAR MILLERS AND 
SUGARCANE GROWERS IN UPPER EGYPT.  
This Master thesis investigates the relationship of buyer– supplier in sugar industry and for 
such purpose we are working on a survey to have accurate information on the subject. This 
Thesis is the under supervision of Professor Arnt Buvik, Molde University College, a 
specialized University in Logistics, Molde Norway. 
The Egyptian sugar industry is an important source of food security due to its strategic 
significant for the country. Sugar industry is a key pillar of the Egyptian national economy 
which employs about 10% of the total country’s workforce, and contributes about 8% of the 
national GDP. In addition to its contribution to the provision of food for the ever-growing 
Egyptian population it also provides crude materials necessary for many other national 
industries with a further contribution to the process of capital accumulation in the national 
economy.  
The survey is conducted to point out the reality of the relationship of buyer_ supplier in 
sugar industry, thus the thesis constitutes an output of such survey. Note that, the written 
thesis may be provided to you upon your request. 
The information provided in the questioner will be kept strictly confidential, which means 
that in no case will any information of the survey be assigned to any individual respondent.    
Finally, your response to the survey is highly needed as this survey only includes a small 
group of suppliers of sugarcane in Upper Egypt as a sample. Kindly complete the 
questionnaire below by answering all questions accurately reflecting, from your point of 
view, the reality of the relationship of your farm with the major sugar mill you deal with. 
Please, pay more attention to the most recent cases of conflicts or settlements. 
Thank you in advance for taking time to answer the questionnaire. Your support in this study 






Professor Arnt Buvik (Supervisor)                                                           
Molde University College 









Molde University College 








A: Background information to the Supplier (Farmer) 
1. Supplier’s Farm name                                                                                                   
2. Approximate annual workforce in your farm                                  
3. Name of the most relevant sugar mill to your farm 
Name                                                                                                                 
4. Approximate annual sales last year (2016) to this sugar mill 
BUYER OPPORTUNISM:  
Based on the sugar mill you have identified above please circle the number that best 
represents your 
 view regarding the following statements  
 
1. This sugar mill very often makes 
false promises regarding the prices of 
sugarcane it will finally pay to its 
seller 
 
2. This sugar mill always refuses to 
offer extension services of supervisors 
to improve our farm’s outputs 
 
3. This sugar mill always try to force 
the prices as low as possible  
 
4. This sugar mill very often makes 
false accusations regarding the quality 
of the sugarcanes to benefit on low 
buying prices 
 
5. Very often this sugar mill uses false 
weighing scales to cheat our farm of 
the actual tonnage supposed to be paid 
for 
 
Strongly disagree                      Strongly agree 









1           2            3            4            5            6    7 
 
 












6. This sugar mill always uses 
unforeseen events to extract extra 









Your farm may have made investments in time and/or money specifically to accommodate 
this sugar mills transactions. These investments would be lost if the sugar mill stopped 
purchasing from your farm 
 
SUPPLIER SPECIFIC INVESTMENT: Please circle the number that best represents 
your view regarding the following statements with respect to your most important 
sugar mill 
 
1. We have invested a lot of time and 
resources in the construction of 
storage facility for the sugarcane 
enroute to this sugar mill 
 
2. Our farm has heavily invested in 
special machinery for the harvesting 
of the sugarcane for this sugar mill. 
 
3. We have strongly adapted our farm 
to accommodate specific types of 
sugarcane variety (breed) needed by 
only this sugar mill 
 
4. Our farm has heavily invested in a 
quality assurance program required 
by this sugar mill to ensure that we 
meet the sugar mill required 
sugarcane quality standards 
Strongly disagree             Strongly agree 






















5. Our farm has made significant 
investment in irrigation facilities that 
are specific for the transactions with 
this sugar mill 
 
6. If this sugar mill stops buying from 
our farm we would lose a significant 
part of investment that we have made 
for adapting to this sugar mill 
 
7.  Our firm has invested significant 
amounts of money and time in 
skillful training of workers to adhere 
to the production standards of the 
sugar mill 
 











1          2           3               4            5           6      7 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL UNCERTAINTY:  Please circle the number that best represents 
your view regarding the following statements with respect to your most important buyer 
 
1.  It is very difficult for us to predict 
the demand for sugarcane from our 
farm 
 
2. The price of the sugarcane paid 




3.  Often It is very difficult for us to 
predict the levels of sugarcane 
production that will be provided by 
other sugarcane farms 
Strongly disagree                  Strongly agree 
















4.  It is very difficult for us to predict 
the price that this sugarmill will pay 
 
5. A lot of uncertaintities are 
involved with regard to availability 
of tools  needed in our production 
activities (fretilizers, purge canals, 
new equipment, new tools to resist 















GENERAL INFORMATION:  Kindly complete the following statements regarding 
your most important sugarmill  by filling in the blank spaces or ticking where 
appropriate 
 
1. How long have you been having trade relations with this sugar miller?                                                      
_______________ years 
 
2. How much in terms of EGP L.E did your farm sell to this sugarmill during the last year 
                                 EGP L.E 
 
3. How much tonnage did your farm produce in the last year (2016)                             
 
4. Are you a member of any sugarcane growers’ association?                 Yes                              No            









 المشارك في االستبيان،  عزيزي 
 طبيقية بين مصانع دراسة استقصائية عن انتهازية المشتري في صناعة السكر المصرية: دراسة ت
 .السكر ومزارعي قصب السكر في صعيد مصر
عة متخصصة في وهي جام النرويج.  جامعة مولدي،ب،  Arnt Buvikيشرف على رسالة الماجستير هذه األستاذ/ 
، والغرض الرئيسي من هذه الرسالة هو دراسة العالقات بين المشتري والمورد في صناعة السكر في الخدمات اللوجستية
 .عيد مصر. نحن نجري حالًيا دراسة استقصائية عن الموضوع للحصول على درجة الماجستيرص
ُتعد صناعة السكر المصرية مصدًرا هاًما لألمن الغذائي نظًرا ألهميتها االستراتيجية للدولة. إذ ُتعد صناعة السكر ركيزة 
ملة في البالد، كما تساهم هذه الصناعة في ٪ من القوة العا10أساسية لالقتصاد الوطني المصري ويعمل بها حوالي 
٪ من الناتج المحلي اإلجمالي. باإلضافة إلى مساهمتها في توفير الغذاء لعدد السكان المتزايد، فضاًل عن إنها 8حوالي 
 .وطنيتوفر المواد الخام الالزمة للعديد من الصناعات الوطنية األخرى وتساهم في عملية تراكم رأس المال في االقتصاد ال
 
كل سؤال يتم  لتفنيدُيرجى العلم بأن المعلومات التي يتضمنها هذا االستبيان سرية تماًما ولن يتم تحديد أي مشارك فردي 
تجمعيه للمساعدة في التحليل النهائي للمعلومات الواردة في هذا االستبيان، وبالتالي فإنه من غير الممكن تعيين المعلومات 
 .الستقصائية للمشاركين الفرديينالتي وردت في الدراسة ا
 
يشمل هذا المسح عينة صغيرة من موردي قصب السكر في صعيد مصر، من ثم، ُيعد ردك هام للغاية. يرجى المشاركة 
ببضع لحظات من وقتك الستكمال االستبيان أدناه عن طريق اإلجابة على جميع األسئلة التي تعكس الوضع الحقيقي 
 .ع السكر الرئيسي لمزرعتك. وخاصة فيما يتعلق يالحاالت األخيرة من النزاعات أو التسوياتبدقة بشأن عالقتك مع مصن
 .شكرا لكم مقدًما على وقتكم في اإلجابة على االستبيان. دعمكم في هذه الدراسة موضع تقدير كبير
 
























                                                    Arnt Buvik ( :االستاذ 
 جامعة مولدي







 (المزارع)المعلومات األساسية عن المورد  :أ
 : اسم مزرعة المورد -1
 :القوى العاملة السنوية التقريبية في المزرعة -2
 :السكر األقرب لمزرعتك( مطحنة)اسم مصنع  -3
 ________________________األسم 
 :السكر المذكورة( مطحنة)إلى مصنع ( 2016)حجم المبيعات السنوية التقريبية للسنة الماضية  -4
 :السكر المحدد أعاله،  ُيرجى وضع دائرة حول الرقم الذي يمثل أفضل إجابة لديك فيما يتعلق بالعبارات التالية( مطحنة)بناًء على مصنع 
 
يقدم مصنع السكر هذا دائًما وعود كاذبة بشأن  -1
المباع  مقابل قصب السكر االسعار التي سيدفعها
  .اليه
 
السكر دائًمأ تقديم الخدمات يرفض مصنع  -2
 .اإلرشادية للمشرفين لتحسين انتاج مزرعتنا
 




باطلة حول ادعائات يدعي مصنع السكر دائًما  -4




ة موازين يستخدم مصنع السكر في أحيان كثير  -5
خاطئة بهدف خداعنا فيما يتعلق باألوزان الحقيقة 
ومن ثم خداعنا بشأن  السعر المفترض لشراء قصب 
 .السكر
 بشدةأوافق                                                ال أوافق على اإلطالق
7          6            5            4                3             2          1 
 
 
7              6            5            4            3            2           1 
 
 















يستخدم مصنع السكر دائًما أحداث غير متوقعة  -6
 .لتلقي دفعات إضافية من مزرعتنا
 
7          6            5            4            3            2           1 
 
 
هل كنت . أو مال تحديًدا من أجل أن تتوافق مع معامالت مصانع السكر /باستثمارات بوقت و  هل قامت مزرعتك
 . ستفقد هذه االستثمارات في حال توقف مصنع السكر عن الشراء من مزرعتك
للسكر بالنسبة  ُيرجى وضع دائرة حول الرقم الذي يمثل أفضل إجابة من وجهة نظركم بخصوص العبارات التالية فيما يتعلق بأهم مصنع 
 :لكم
 
لقد استثمرنا وقت طويل وموارد كثيرة في انشاء  -1
 .مخزن لقصب السكر ألجل هذا المصنع
 
استثمرت مزرعتنا استثماًرا كبيًرا في ماكينات   -2




لقد  جعلنا مزرعتنا مالئمة النتاج أنواع محددة  -3
 .ر يحتاجها فقط هذا المصنعمن قصب السك
 
استثمرت مزرعتنا في برنامج ضمان جودة طلبه  -4
مصنع السكر هذا لضمان تلبية معايير جودة قصب 
 .السكر المطلوبة من مصنع السكر هذا
  
استثمارات كبيرة في مرافق الري انفقت مزرعتنا  -5
 المحددة من أجل المعامالت مع مصنع السكر هذا.
  
      أوافق بشدة                                            على اإلطالق ال أوافق
7          6            5            4            3            2           1 
 
 
7          6            5            4            3            2           1 
 
 
7          6            5            4            3            2           1 
 
 










صنع السكر عن الشراء من مزرعتنا   إذا توقف م -6
فقد نفقد جزء كبير من اسثمارتنا التي قمنا بها من 
 .أجل التوافق مع هذا المصنع خصيًصا
 
استثمرت مزرعتنا أموااًل كثيرة وأمضت وقًتا  -7
طوياًل لتدريب العاملين تدريًبا ماهًرا لاللتزام بمعايير 
 .االنتاج الخاصة بمصنع السكر هذا




7          6            5            4            3            2           1 
 
 
 :ُيرجى وضع دائرة حول الرقم الذي يمثل أفضل إجابة من وجهة نظركم بخصوص العبارات التالية فيما يتعلق بأهم مشتري بالنسبة لكم
 
بأ بالطلب على قصب من الصعب أن نتن -1
 .السكر من مزرعتنا
 
 
السعر الذي يدفعه مصنع قصب السكر هذا  -2
 .يتغير بسرعة كبيرة
 
 
في الغالب، من الصعب علينا التنبؤ  -3
بمستويات انتاج قصب السكر التي تنتجها مزارع 
 . قصب السكر األخرى 
 
 
من الصعب علينا التنبؤ بالسعر الذي  -4
 .سيدفعه مصنع السكر هذا
 
 
 أوافق بشدة                                              ال أوافق على اإلطالق



















يوجد الكثير من األمور التي ال يمكن التيقن   -5
بها فيما يتعلق بمدى توافر األدوات التي 
األسمدة وقنوات )نحتاجها في أنشطة االنتاج 
التطهير والمعدات الجديدة، واألدوات الجديدة 
 (.لمقاومة الحشرات واألمراض






ألماكن الفارغة وذلك عن طريق ملء اُيرجى استكمال العبارات التالية بشأن أهم مصنع سكر لديكم : معلومات عامة
 .أو وضع عالمة عند اللزوم
 سنة  ---------؟ هذا منذ متى تجمعكم عالقات تجارية مع مصنع السكر -1
في خالل العام  هذا بكم من المال بالجنيه المصري باعت مزرعتكم لمصنع السكر -2
 .جنيه مصري ...........................    ...الماضي 
في السنة الماضية  كم طن انتجته مزرعتكم -3
(2016...... )....................................................... 
 ال -----نعم     ---جمعية خاصة بمزارعين قصب السكر؟    /مؤسسة /هل انت عضو في أي رابطة  -4
            ----------المنظمة و اسم عم ، ما هإذا كانت اإلجابة ن







Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Normality 
 
 
Appendix 2(a): Factor Analysis; KMO measure of sampling adequacy, Bartlett’s Test 
of Sphericity 
 







Appendix 3: Exploratory Factor Analysis (n=120) 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
 Component 
UNCERT SUPSPEC 
SUPSPEC1 -.151 .831 
SUPSPEC4 .161 .487 
SUPSPEC7 .565 .567 
UNCERT1 .813 .139 
UNCERT3 .844 -.045 
UNCERT4 .817 .231 
UNCERT5 .847 .049 
Eigen value 2.743 1.487 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.  
aRotation converged in 3 iterations.  
 
 















Appendix 5(a): Research’s Model Summary 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 





F Change df1 df2 Sig. F 
Change 
1 .695a .632 .612 .81764 .632 29.234 6 113a .000 
2 .795 .666 .633 .79654 .033 30.284 5 110 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LOGWORKFORCE, LOGTIME, MEANUNCERT, LOGSALES, MEANSSPI 
b. Dependent Variable: avergopportu 




Appendix 5(b): Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 129.499 6 21.583 29.234 .000 
Residual 75.545 113 .669   
Total 205.044 119    
2 
Regression 131.456 5 20.321 30.284 .000 
Residual 70.435 110 .432   
Total 205.044 119    
a. Predictors: (Constant), LOGWORKFORCE, LOGTIME, MEANUNCERT, LOGSALES, MEANSSPI 
b. Dependent Variable: avergopportu 
c. Predictors: (Constant), intraspixuncert, LOGWORKFORCE, LOGTIME, MEANUNCERT, LOGSALES, 
MEANSSPI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
